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The Effects of United States Antitrust
Laws on the International Operations of
American Firms
Melvin Sehwechter*
RichardSehepard**

UnitedStates antitrust laws increasinglyhave affected the international
activities of US. corporations. The business community maintains that
these laws have hurt international operations. In this article, Messrs.
Schwechter and Schepardconsiderfive major areasof concern to American
businessmen: potential antitrust attacks upon licensing agreements, use of
the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine as an antitrust defense, subject
matterjurisdictionanddiscovery, applicationofthe "rule ofreason" to internationaljointventures, and the multifacetednature of antitrustenforcement.
They then discuss the Justice Department'sresponse to the businesscommunity andpropose several recommendations that should help United States
firms reduce the antitrust uncertaintytheyface in exporting andother internationaloperations.

In recent years, there has been a continuing controversy between
the nation's business community and its antitrust enforcement representatives regarding the effects of U.S. antitrust laws' on the interna*
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tional operations of U.S. firms. Although its roots date back to the
early part of this century,' the immediate cause of this controversy has
been the rapidly expanding trade deficit which the United States has
experienced during the last eight years. In 1971, this country registered
its first trade deficit since 1893. 3 Since 1971, there have been only two
trade surplus years.4 In the last three years, the trade deficit has increased dramatically from nearly $5.9 billion in 1976, to $26.5 billion in
1977, to $28.5 billion in 1978.1 Figures for the first nine months of 1979
indicate that a substantial yearly deficit is likely to continue.6

The deteriorating international trade position clearly presents a direct threat to the country's economic well-being. It has been, in part,
responsible for a decline in the value of the dollar relative to certain
other currencies, a steady rise in the price of most imports, disturbing

rates of inflation, job loss in import competing industries, a slow rate of
job increase in the export sector of the economy, and an increased FedAct, 15 U.S.C. § 12-27, 44 (Supp. I, 1977); § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §
45 (1976); and the Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976).
2 A 1916 Federal Trade Commission Report to the Congress on Cooperation in American
Export Trade, S. Doc. No. 426, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1915), pointed out that in comparison to
foreign traders in other nations, "doubt and fear as to legal restrictions prevent Americans from
developing equally effective organizations for overseas business and that the foreign trade of our
manufacturers and producers, particularly the smaller concerns, suffers in consequences." REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY ON H.R. 17350, H.R. REP. No. 1118, 64th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 3 (1916). This report, which concerned the forerunner of the bill which became the
Webb-Pomerene Act, stated that:
There are many great lawyers who think there is nothing in existing laws to prevent American manufacturers and exporters from combining in whatever manner they please in foreign
countries to dispose of their products; but other lawyers take the position that "there is doubt
about this power, and in order to absolutely clairfy the situation and in common fairness to
our American exporters, we present this bill.
Id.
3 For statistics for years up to and including 1970, see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES BICENTENNIAL EDITION,

Colonial

Times to 1970, pt. 2, Series U-196, at 884-85 (1975). For Bureau of the Census statistics for the
years 1971-1977, see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRY AND TRADE ADMINISTRATION, OVERSEAS BUSINESS REP. 78-21, UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE ANNUAL 1971-1977,3 (1978). These
balance of trade statistics are calculated on a Free-Along-Side basis.

4 Balance of trade surpluses of approximately $1 billion and $11 billion were registered in
1973 and 1975 respectively. Id.
5 Id. The 1978 figure can be found in U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
SUMMARY OF U.S. EXPORT AND IMPORT MERCHANDISE TRADE 5 (Jan. 1979).
6 For the first nine months of 1979, the United States trade deficit totalled more than $18.05
billion on a Free-Along-Side basis. Id. (Sept. 1979). Effective with the January, 1979, statistics,
the Bureau of the Census altered its method of calculating the monthly trade figures. Beginning in
that month, adjusted export and import totals represent the sum of commodity components (I e.,
SITC section totals) adjusted for seasonal and working-day variations. In earlier periods, the
monthly totals for exports and imports were adjusted independently of the components. For further details regarding the changed method of calculation, see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, SUPPLEMENT TO THE JANUARY 1979 ISSUE OF REP. FT 900 (1979).
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eral budget deficit.7 Further deterioration in our international trade
position could worsen these already disturbing trends.
For much of its history, the United States did not need to be especially concerned about its international trade position. Domestic supplies of energy and most other raw materials have, until recently,
allowed our industrial expansion to proceed without substantial reliance on imports. Moreover, our large domestic market created little
need for vigorous export efforts.
Significant increases in U.S. exports, when they did occur, were, in
large part, based on two factors-strong foreign demand, as was the
case after World War II, and the technological advantage U.S. industry
held over its foreign competitors.' After World War II, however, Western European and Japanese industry was rebuilt, and firms in those
countries now offer competitive alternatives to U.S. supplies of most
manufactures. Furthermore, in many cases, the technological advantage which U.S. firms used to hold has been eroded,9 and the nation's
positive balance of trade in high technology goods is diminishing.'" In
short, U.S. firms no longer have an effective comparative advantage in
the manufacture of many goods.
In light of this situation, it is timely to review the positions of the
various parties to the controversy. Following this review, several suggestions for improving the antitrust climate in which U.S. firms conduct their international operations will be offered.
THE POSITION OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY

The U.S. business community's concerns regarding the effects of
the antitrust laws on its international operations have been principally
set forth in two documents-the 1974 Report of the NationalAssociation
of Manufacturers on the InternationalImplications of U.S. Antitrust
Laws" and the same year's FinalReport of the Antitrust Task Force on
7 SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND

URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON U.S. EXPORT POLICY 1-2 (Comm. Print
1979) [hereinafter cited as STEVENSON REPORT]. This report's findings and recommendations

were based on a year-long study of export policy by the Subcommittee which included extensive
hearings on the subject.
8 Id. at 2, 6, 19.
9 Id. at 2, 8.
10 Id. at 20.
11

NAT'L ASS'N OF MANUFACTURERS,

1974 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS (1974) [hereinafter cited as NAM STUDY], reprintedin Hearings on InternationalAspects of Antitrust Laws
Be/ore the Subcomm. on Antitrust andMonopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. 1416 (1973-1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
MANUFACTURERS ON THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
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InternationalTrade andInvestment of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
on U.S. Antitrust Laws andAmerican Exports. 2

These reports make several important allegations regarding what
the business community perceives to be the effects of U.S. antitrust laws
on its international operations. First, U.S. antitrust laws have injured
the international competitiveness of U.S. firms, particularly in the area
of foreign joint ventures. Foreign countries actively promote, or at
least permit, the formation of consortia for the purpose of submitting a
single bid on major foreign projects. U.S. firms seeking to engage in
similar activities face uncertainty with respect to potential government
as well as private antitrust actions. Second, the application of U.S. antitrust laws has presented particularly serious problems for small and
medium-sized U.S. exporters in the areas of formation of export associations, joint ventures, and the conclusion of licensing agreements.
Third, uncertainty regarding the antitrust implications of a proposed
course of business conduct often results in U.S. firms deciding not to
pursue potentially profitable business ventures abroad. Fourth, because of the relative restrictiveness of U.S. antitrust laws vis-a-vis similar statutes in other industrialized countries and the generally
"adversary" posture existing between U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies and the American business community, U.S. efforts to improve the
balance of trade are impeded and U.S. international competitiveness is
adversely affected.
Since the publication of these two reports, the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary also
investigated the international aspects of U.S. antitrust laws. 3 It heard
from numerous witnesses, including the chairman of the Antitrust Task
Force of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.' 4 While the aforementioned
allegations were repeated in those hearings,"5 no concrete examples of
how the antitrust laws have adversely affected the international operations of U.S. firms were provided. The Chamber of Commerce witness
testified that specific examples were hard to identify because it is diffi12 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ANTITRUST TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT OF THE U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ON U.S. ANTITRUST

LAWS AND AMERICAN EXPORTS (1974), reprintedin Hearings,supra note 11, at 163.

13 Hearings,note I I supra.
14 Id. at 146-61 (remarks of James M. Nicholson).
15 Id. Mr. Nicholson testified that "the business community has an honest perception that the
antitrust laws are barriers, are problems for them. And, therefore, there are problems." Id. at 155.
However, it should also be noted that some of the other witnesses who appeared before the Subcommittee disagreed with the allegations of the Chamber and the National Association of Manufacturers. See Hearings, supra note I1, at 4, 129, and 1318 (remarks of E. Ernest Goldstein,
Samuel Pisar, and Robert Beshar).
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cult to isolate antitrust considerations as controlling in impeding the
international operations of an ongoing business or in the failure to undertake a foreign business venture.' 6 While he asserted that the Chamber's Antitrust Task Force was going to be reactivated to search for
such examples, no further report was forthcoming.' 7
Recently, the Chamber has restated some of its earlier allegations
and has recommended that when actions are taken under the antitrust
laws, distinctions should be made between domestic and foreign transactions, with a less restrictive standard for the latter.'s Several articles
have appeared in the popular press which have suggested a reevaluation of U.S. antitrust laws and the way they have been enforced, in
light of the changed international economic situation in which the
United States finds itself. 1' Moreover, Senator Jacob Javits, a longtime
observer of international economic issues and a member of the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures,2"
was sufficiently concerned about the effects of U.S. antitrust laws on the
international trade of U.S. firms to have written to the commission's
chairman, Assistant Attorney General Shenefield, urging the commission to consider a series of specific antitrust issues which may have an
adverse impact upon such trade.2 ' Increasing congressional interest in
the subject has recently been evidenced by hearings held by a Senate
subcommittee on proposed legislation to expand the Webb-Pomerene
antitrust exemption and to create a new antitrust exemption for export
trading companies.2 2

Perhaps most importantly, a recent study done under contract for
the Bureau of Mines of the U.S. Department of the Interior on selected
factors having an impact on the international competitiveness of the
U.S. minerals industry found that representatives of that industry
widely subscribe to the view that U.S. antitrust laws force them to oper-

ate, at home, and especially abroad, at a competitive disadvantage in
16 Id. at 151.

17 Id. at 150.
18 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, POLICIES AND PROGRAMS FOR EXPANDING U.S. EXPORTS,

15-16 (1979).
19 See, e.g., Goldman & Wells, Save the Business Baronies, Wash. Post, Sept. 17, 1978, at B 1,
col. 5; Harman, Foran '"merica,Inc.",NEWSWEEK, Mar. 12, 1979, at 20; How Government Disincentives Discourage U.S. Export, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, Sept. 1978, at 23-24.
20 See note 196 infra.
21 Letter from Senator Jacob J. Javits to John H. Shenefield, Chairman, National Commission
for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures (Aug. 25, 1978). For Chairman Shenefield's
response refusing to recommend Commission consideration of the issues raised by Senator Javits,
with the exception of the Webb-Pomerene Act, see note 138 infra.
22 Hearingson S.864, S, 1499, andS.1663 Before the Subcomm. on InternationalFinanceofthe
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES

496
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comparison to their foreign counterparts.23 While these representatives

generally agreed that the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
laws presents no insurmountable barrier to the growth of the American
non-fuel minerals industry, they argued that antitrust restrictions unduly hamper the effectiveness of their search for commodity supplies,
particularly overseas, and that the restraints lack political and economic logic because they do not reflect other national priorities such as
export promotion, reduction of the trade deficit, and the need to develop non-fuel mineral resources abroad.24
This report's findings and interviews conducted by the authors
with businessmen and their antitrust counsel confirm that the business
community continues to be concerned with the effects of the antitrust
laws on its international operations, despite the acknowledged efforts of
the Justice Department in the last several years to clarify the applicability of those laws to U.S. foreign commerce. 25 Following is a discussion
of five areas of continuing major concern to the business community.
LICENSING U.S. TECHNOLOGY

In the licensing type of case, a U.S. firm grants a "know-how"
license to a foreign firm, but attempts in the licensing agreement to
prohibit the foreign firm from selling products manufactured under
that license in the United States. Such a territorial restriction would
likely be challenged by the Justice Department if the length of the restriction exceeded the time necessary for "reverse-engineering" 26 of the
technology, unless the parties could justify the restriction as necessary
to the technology-sharing agreement.2 7 Such a standard is obviously
subjective and in many cases it may not be possible to define the period
precisely. Because of the difficulty in estimating such a period and the
possibility of an antitrust attack on a restriction which the licensor be23 INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC., EVALUATION OF SELECTED FACTORS IMPACTING ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. MINERALS INDUSTRY PREPARED FOR UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF MINES 180 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as BUREAU OF MINES REPORT].
24 Id. at 221, 223.
25 See text accompanying notes 168-79 infra.

26 In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974), the Supreme Court defined
"reverse-engineering" as "starting with the known product and working backward to divine the
(citing National Tube Co. v. Eastprocess which aided in its development or manufacture.

em Tube Co., 3 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 459, 462 (1902), af'd, 69 Ohio St. 560, 70 N.E. 1127 (1903)).
27 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div., ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 34 (rev. ed. Mar. 1, 1977), reprinted in [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No.
799, at E-1, and [1977] 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 266, at I [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST
GUIDE].
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lieves is within the reverse-engineering period, U.S. firms may, in such
cases, simply refrain from entering into licensing agreements with
foreign firms for fear that the licensee will use the license to compete
with the U.S. firm in the U.S. market. Due to the reluctance by the
American firm to grant the license, the prospective foreign licensee may
well substitute a foreign licensor for the American firm when such an
alternative exists or else, when it does not, a licensing agreement may
very well simply not be concluded. This latter possibility then serves to
encourage the potential foreign licensee to develop the technology in
question independently.
Such developments, it is argued, could have several effects on the
U.S. economy. First, the failure to conclude a licensing agreement
means that the foreign licensee will not be making royalty payments to
the U.S. licensor. Such payments would result in an improvement in
the balance of payments position of the United States. Second, the failure to conclude a licensing agreement may result in a lost opportunity
to increase U.S. exports of related capital equipment to the foreign licensee." Finally, ifsuch licensing agreements could contain exclusive
grantback provisions,2 9 U.S. firms would have the benefit of the most
up-to-date technological developments occurring in other countries
which are based on the licensed technology.
If a licensing agreement is entered into, and the territorial restriction in question is included, the licensor cannot be certain that the restriction will not be subject to an antitrust attack alleging that it is
unreasonable. Even the Antitrust Guide3 ° does not provide clear guidance on this point, and the guidance it does provide may not completely reflect the existing state of the law. As noted, the Antitrust
Guide states that, unless otherwise justified, such a territorial restriction
would likely be challenged if it exceeded the "reverse-engineering period." However, several lower court opinions indicate that, in certain
28 SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENT AND INFORMATION POLICY, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INDUS-

TRIAL INNOVATION, DRAFT REPORT ON PATENT POLICY 3 (1978). The Advisory Committee is
convened by and reports to the Secretary of Commerce. See also Lovell, Appraising Foreign LicensingPerformance,in NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, INC., STUDIES IN BUSINESS

POLICY No. 128, 49-54 (1969).
29 An exclusive grantback provision generally requires a licensee to grant back title or an
exclusive license on any new patents or "know-how" it may obtain or develop related to the
licensed technology rights. The Department of Justice has noted two factors which will influence
its decision whether to challenge an exclusive grantback provision in a particular case. These
factors are the scope of the licensee's obligation to grant back and the competitive relationship
between the licensor and licensee. See ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 27, at 42-45.
30 See note 27 supra.
3t Id. at 34.
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cases, the use of "know-how" by a licensee or joint venture may be
restricted indefinitely for the "life" 32of the "know-how," i e., the period
during which it retains its secrecy.
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN COMPULSION DEFENSE

The second area of concern involves the application of the doctrine of foreign sovereign compulsion to antitrust suits against allegedly
anticompetitive practices of U.S. firms in their international operations.
Under this doctrine, U.S. firms may have a complete defense to actions
which would otherwise constitute antitrust violations, if such actions
are compelled by an edict or decree of a foreign sovereign.3 3 The business community's concerns regarding the application of this doctrine
involve two basic issues-the degree of foreign compulsion required to
invoke the defense, and restrictions on use of the defense.
As to the first concern, activities in a foreign country compelled by
a validly issued decree or edict of that country's sovereign will normally meet the requirements of the defense.34 However, anticompetitive activities implemented voluntarily by private parties which are
merely aided or authorized by foreign laws, but not compelled by them,
will not be exempted from the application of U.S. antitrust law.3 5 Antitrust liability will similarly accrue where a foreign state delegates
power to a private firm to undertake certain activities which it carries
out in an anticompetitive manner. 36 Finally, the situation in which
government officials "request" or informally encourage, but do not legally "compel," a U.S. firm to take certain anticompetitive actions will
37
also probably result in a prosecutable antitrust violation.
Questions have been raised as to whether that ought to be the case
32 Shin Nippon Koki Co. v. Irvin Industries, Inc., [1975] 1 Trade Cases %60,347 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1975); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968). See also prepared
remarks of Douglas E. Rosenthal, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, before the American Bar Association Section on Corporation Banking and
Business Law National Institute on Worldwide Legal Challenges to U.S. Transnational Business 6
(Dec. 15, 1978).
33 In an international setting, the leading case is Interamerican Refning Corp. v. Texaco
Aaracaibo,Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). In a domestic context, the doctrine of sovereign compulsion is based on the case of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943), in which the
Supreme Court stated that: "The state [California] in adopting and enforcing the. . . program
made no contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish

monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman Act
did not undertake to prohibit."
34 Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. at 1297-98.
35 United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
36 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
37 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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in some foreign trade and investment contexts. Foreign governments,
particularly those in the developing countries, often expect foreign
firms operating in their countries to undertake certain activities which,
if done in the United States, might result in the commission of an antitrust violation. The undertaking of such activities, while not explicitly
compelled by the foreign sovereign, may be an important part of the
foreign government's economic policy, and are, in many cases, a condition of doing further business in the foreign country. The sovereign
may also explicitly or implicitly menace a firm with threats of expropriation of its properties and operating "difficulties" if it fails to comply
with the requested undertaking. These types of situations are particularly likely to arise in many of the lesser developed countries where the
foreign government itself operates or directs key sectors of the country's
economy and where governmental activities may not always be undertaken in strict accordance with procedures established by law.3"
The problem may also arise in developed societies where the government and the private sector may prefer to avoid the formality and
rigidity of legislation, and policy may be implemented through discussions and voluntary actions which domestic law permits, but does not
require. 39 The present approach requiring a formal soverign act compelling anticompetitive activities in order to have a valid defense makes
it difficult for U.S. firms to operate in certain foreign situations where
they may be caught between conflicting sovereignties.
Operating difficulties are also caused by the divergence between
the case law and the statements of the Justice Department in the Anitrust Guide regarding the restrictions involved in the application of the
foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine. One of the leading cases in this
area, InteramericanRefining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo,Inc.,40 upheld
the use of the foreign sovereign compulsion defense in a private treble
damage antitrust action based on an alleged horizontal group boycott
implemented within the United States. 4 ' The plaintiff charged that it
was unable to obtain the Venezuelan crude oil it needed for its U.S.
38 One respected commentator, a former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, has questioned the applicability of the general rule in at least one situation. He asks whether a casual
suggestion by former President Amin of Uganda would more properly have been regarded as an
"informal encouragement" or as a "command by the state as sovereign." Baker, Antitrust Conflicts
Between Friends: Canada andthe United States in the Mid-70s, I I CORNELL INT'L L.J. 165, 178
n.68 (1978).
39 Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States: A View
From Abroad, 1! CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195, 212 (1978).
40 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
41 Id. at 1298-99.
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refinery because defendants' suppliers refused to deal with it.42 This
refusal was based on an order of the Venezuelan Government forbidding sales by defendants to the plaintiff.43 Refusing to conduct an inquiry into the validity of the order under Venezuelan laws, the court
sustained defendant's position that its anticompetitive actions were
compelled by Venezuela and hence it was not liable.44
The Department of Justice, for its part, construes the foreign sovereign compulsion defense quite narrowly and has expressly stated in
the Antitrust Guide that to the extent its interpretation is inconsistent
with the holding in Interamerican,it believes the holding in that case to
be incorrect, and it will follow its own position in making enforcement
decisions.4 5 Specifically, the Antitrust Division places three restrictions
on the exercise of the foreign sovereign compulsion defense.4 6 First, it
will not apply to acts done within the United States. 47 Second, the doctrine will not cover activities based on acts other than those of a truly
sovereign entity acting within the scope of its powers under its laws.
Third, the doctrine will not apply unless the affected company is being
"reasonable" in doing what it felt it was compelled to do.
EXTRATERRITORIALITY

Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Related to the concerns posed by the application of the foreign
sovereign compulsion doctrine are those more general ones involving
the proper scope of subject matter jurisdiction under the antitrust laws
over anticompetitive activities undertaken abroad. Early in this century, U.S. antitrust jurisdiction over acts occurring in foreign countries
was limited by the decision in the case of American Banana Co. v.
UnitedFruit Co. 48 In that case, it was alleged that the defendant was
responsible for the Costa Rican Government's seizure of the plantations and railways of American Banana-a potential competitor-so
that defendant could pursue anticompetitive activities. 49 The Supreme
Court held that such acts were outside the scope of U.S. antitrust juris42 Id. at 1294.
43 Id.

44 Id. at 1304.
45 ANTITRUST GuiDE, supra note 27, at 52.
46 Id. at 54-55.
47 The Antitrust Guide does not take a position as to the validity of the defense with respect to
acts done in third countries, noting the dissent of Justice White in Banco Nacionalde Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 at 439, 445-50 (1964).
48 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
49 Id. at 354.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

1:492(1979)

diction.5" Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court commented that,
"[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act
as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done."' 5 1 However, subsequent cases5 2 have
limited the effect of this holding to the facts on which it is based. Reflective of more recent judicial thinking on the question of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws is the opinion of Judge
Learned Hand in the now famous case of United States v. Aluminum

Co. of America,53 wherein the Sherman Act was held to apply to anticompetitive agreements reached abroad which were intended to affect
U.S. imports and did actually affect them.5 4 Based in part on this decision, the Justice Department has stated that "when foreign transactions
have a substantial and foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce, they are

subject to U.S. law regardless of where they take place."55
The application of such a subject matter jurisdictional scope-the

"effects" doctrine-has caused concern in various foreign countries and
among U.S. multinationals operating in such countries.5 6 They have
argued that U.S. antitrust enforcement activities often do not take sufficiently into account the antitrust policies or sensibilities of foreign governments and in fact may infringe on their sovereignty.5 7 This is
especially true in those industrialized societies, such as Canada 58 and

50 Id. at 357.
51 Id. at 356.
52 See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v.
Nat'l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927);
Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404
F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
53 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
54 Id. at 444.
55 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 27, at 6 (citing Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280
(1952); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 444; and Continental Ore Co. v.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. at 704-05).
56 The U.S. non-fuel minerals industry views the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
laws as the single most counterproductive and severe restraint imposed by those laws on the industry's international competitiveness in the acquisition of materials and reserves. See BUREAU OF
MINES REPORT, supra note 23, at 212. The "effects" doctrine by its very nature creates uncertainty
in some foreign transactions because under it there is no certain way of delineating the geographic
and functional outer boundaries of its reach. Prepared statement of Professor James A. Rahl
before the Senate Comm. on Gov't Affairs on S. 1010, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (Oct. 31, 1979).
57 See United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., [1963] TRADE CAS.
70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modofed, [1965] TRADE CAS. T 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United
States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 195 1),final decree entered, 105
F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
58 A recent example of Canadian and U.S. multinational concern over U.S. attempts to enforce U.S. antitrust laws extraterritorially was discussed in the BUREAU OF MINES REPORT, supra
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Great Britain,

9

which have antitrust laws of their own. Accordingly,

the antitrust
the necessity of U.S. attempts at judicial enforcement of
60
laws extraterritorially has increasingly been questioned.

The Justice Department has recognized these concerns and is trying to become more sensitive to jurisdictional questions and related
note 23. It involved indictments against eight U.S. companies for conspiring to (1)restrict the
amount of potash produced in the United States (2) stabilize and raise the price of potash produced and sold in the United States and (3) restrict exports and imports. The indictments resulted
from certain actions of the provincial government of Saskatchewan in 1975 and 1976 to limit
output from Canadian and U.S. producers operating in the province, and named various Saskatchewan politicians and companies as "unindicted co-conspirators." While charges were later
dismissed, the incident resulted in: consternation among U.S. business executives and Canadian
politicians because various Saskatchewan politicians and companies were named as "unindicted
co-conspirators"; ambassadorial level discussions between U.S. and Canadian government officials; and the purchase by the provincial government of most of the U.S. owned operations within
its territory. For further details regarding this matter, see BUREAU OF MINES REPORT, supra note
23, at 218-19.
59 The British have objected strenuously to recent indictments brought against three foreign
owned shipping groups for fixing freight rates on container shipments in the North Atlantic liner
trades between 1971 and 1975. (Four other companies and 13 executives were also indicted.)
Nolo contendere pleas were entered and fines ranging from $50,000 to $1 million were imposed.
See United States v. Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., Crim No. 79-00271 (D.D.C., filed June 1,
1979); United States v. Bates, Crim. No. 79-00272 (D.D.C.,filed June 1, 1979).
In regard to these charges, British Trade Under Secretary Norman Tebbit recently told Parliament that,
Shipping is an international activity, affecting the interests of both countries. Any questions
that arise should therefore be dealt with jointly, and we consider it wrong in principle for the
United States to exercise unilateral control over shipping between the two countries, in disregard of [British] economic interests and shipping policies.
British Threaten Retaliation Over Shipping Antitrust Judgments, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 922, at A-30 (1979). British Trade Secretary John Nott further noted that the activities
upon which the indictments were based would not have been illegal in the United Kingdom.
Nott also warned of Britain's intention to reexamine its cooperation with the United States on
antitrust questions and enforcement in the United Kingdom of the antitrust judgments of U.S.
courts. Indeed, legislation was recently introduced in Parliament which reportedly would: (1)
block enforcement in the United Kingdom of U.S. court judgments against British firms in certain
antitrust cases, (2) block enforcement in the United Kingdom of multiple damage awards by U.S.
courts, (3) allow British firms to recover in a British court the non-compensatory part of multiple
damage awards assessed against them by U.S. courts unless the British victim was "ordinarily
resident" in the U.S. at the relevant time, and (4) authorize British officials to stop British firms for
being compelled by U.S. subpoenas or court orders to supply information and documents sought
in U.S. antitrust investigations or by U.S. regulatory agencies. See Protectionfrom U.S. Law
Sought, Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1979, at B-1, col. I; The British Answer, The Economist, Nov. 3, 1979,
at 64-66.
60 For example, the Director General of the Bureau of Commercial and Commodity Relations
of Canada's Department of External Affairs has suggested that in cases where producing governments establish a manufacturing or resource marketing arrangement which is opposed by consumer governments, it is inappropriate for one of the governments involved in the conflict to
attempt to solve it by invoking its law in its courts to adjudicate the legality of conduct in another
jurisdiction. See Stanford, supra note 39, at 201. See also INTERNATIONAL LAW ASS'N, REPORT
OF THE FIFTY-FIRST CONFERENCE HELD AT TOKYO 565-92 (1965), for a collection of diplomatic
protests.
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comity issues.6" Antitrust Division Chief John Shenefield has noted
that he fully recognizes that "unique factors are involved in the foreign
commerce aspects of enforcement and I intend to ensure that we give
them adequate consideration." 6 2 Moreover, meetings have been held
between U.S. and foreign antitrust officials in attempts to ease the foreign distaste for U.S. prosecution of international cartel practices affecting U.S. commerce, particularly in cases where foreign
governments themselves participate in or at least sanction such practices.6 3 While these efforts have represented an attempt to improve the
situation, they clearly have not been entirely successful. 6'
Added judicial sensitivity for jurisdictional questions has also recently been in evidence. The opinion in Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank ofAmerica6 5 is probably the leading example. In that case, it was
alleged that U.S. foreign commerce was directly and substantially affected by a conspiracy in which defendants and others, in the United
States and Honduras, sought to prevent plaintiff, through its Honduras
subsidiaries, from milling lumber in Honduras and exporting it to the
United States-leaving control of the Honduran lumber export business in the hands of a few select individuals financed and controlled by
the defendant. In its decision, the court set forth what it felt to be the
proper tripartite approach to antitrust jurisdictional questions for allegedly anticompetitive actions occurring abroad.6 6
The court said that first one must inquire as to whether the alleged
61 Associate Attorney General Michael Egan has stated that the Justice Department will take
the following steps to try to accommodate foreign concerns over U.S. antitrust enforcement:
(i) consult with foreign governments which desire to explore means of accommodating conflicting national interests;
(ii) better understand the ways in which, and the extent to which, the techniques of extraterritorial enforcement offend foreign concepts of territorial sovereignty;
(iii) notify any foreign government at any time that an Antitrust Division official wishes to
conduct investigative interviews or other official business within its territory; and
(iv) review existing arrangements for notification and consultation with foreign governments whose interests are affected in specific investigations.
Address by Michael J. Egan, Associate Attorney General, before the International Bar Association, Business Law Section 8-11 (Nov. 3, 1977).
62 Prepared remarks of John H. Shenefield before the American Bar Association 1978 Annual
Meeting, Section of International Law 21 (Aug. 9, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Shenefield Speech].
63 See CanadianandAmerican Antitrust Officials Meet to Discuss Extraterritorial Enforcement,
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), No. 829, at A-8, A-9 (1977); interview with John H.
Shenefield in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 875 at AA-6, AA-7 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Shenefield Interview]; Stanford, supra note 39, at 207; prepared remarks of Donald L.
Flexner, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, 1978 Fordham Corporate Law
Institute 7-10 (Nov. 15, 1978).
64 See note 59 supra.
65 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
66 Id. at 615.
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restraint affected, or was intended to affect, the foreign commerce of
the United States.67 If so, one must look to see if it is of such a type and
magnitude that results in cognizable injury to the plaintiff so as to con-

stitute a violation of the Sherman Act.68 Then, if these two prerequisites are satisfied, an inquiry must be made to see if as a matter of
international comity and fairness the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
United States should be asserted to cover the alleged conduct. 69 Al-

though the court's analysis did not result in its affirming the lower
court's dismissal of the suit for, among other things, lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, 7° its recognition of the necessity to take into ac-

count other nations' interests in deciding the proper scope of subject
matter jurisdiction under the antitrust laws was most significant.7 t
The Ninth Circuit's balancing of competing interests approach in
Timberlane was recently adopted by the Third Circuit as well in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.72 In that case, the court listed

ten factors which it felt should be weighed in determining whether an
exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate. 73 Further judicial developments
addressing the Timberlane approach can probably be expected.
67 Id. at 613, 615.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 614-15. This inquiry, as to comity, should take into account the following factors:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of
business of the corporations;
(iii) the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance;
(iv) the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those
elsewhere;
(v) the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce;
(vi) the foreseeability of such effect; and
(vii) the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as
compared with conduct abroad.
Id. at 614.
70 Id. at 615.
71 Id. at 613-15.
72 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
73 Id. at 1297-98. The ten factors are:
I. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to
perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by both
countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the foreign
nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
Id.
(i)
(ii)
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Discovery

Once the Justice Department decides that the exercise of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction over anticompetitive acts occurring abroad is proper,
in order to prosecute its case successfully, it must often seek access to
documents located in foreign countries.74 Attempts to secure access to

such documents present another potential source of friction in dealing
with foreign countries.
This point is illustrated by the decision of the British Law Lords in
the now famous international uranium cartel litigation involving the
U.S. firm Westinghouse." They held that an attempt to obtain testimony, in which the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice was most interested, in Britain, from British subjects regarding an
alleged international cartel to regulate the price and output of uranium
and to limit competition, was not to be allowed because it constituted
an attempted exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in matters with potential criminal implications, which in the view of the British Government was prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom.7 6 In
their decision, the Lords specifically noted the United Kingdom's longstanding policy of non-cooperation with U.S. courts seeking to enforce
U.S. antitrust laws overseas.1 7 Problems have also occurred with respect to the Justice Department's attempts to secure information in Canada regarding the existence of an international uranium cartel,78 and
to obtain documents in foreign countries in connection with its interna79
tional investigation of the oil industry.

A further problem arises from the fact that some countries have
enacted so called "blocking statutes"-legislation restricting the ability
of U.S. enforcement agencies or courts to require the production of
documents in U.S. proceedings from foreign corporations.8 0 United
74 See Note, Discovery of Documents LocatedAbroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Recent Developments in the Law Concerningthe ForeignIllegality Excuse/orNon-Production, 14 VA. J. INT'L
L. 747 (1974); Note, ForeignNondisclosureLaws and DomesticDiscovery Ordersin Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979).
75 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L.
1977). For a full discussion of this case and its history see Baker, supra note 38, at 187-89; Comment, The InternationalUranium Cartel-Litigationand LegalImplications, 14 TEx. INT'L L.J. 59,
97-100 (1979).
76 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. at 96.
77 Id. at 94.
78 Shenefield Interview, supra note 63, at AA-6.
79 ForeignNations Object to Compliance With Justice Data Demands in Oil Probe, ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 918, at A-7 (1979).
80 Examples of such "blocking statutes" are as follows:
(1) Canada-Business Records Protection Act, [1947] Ont. Stat. c.10 (codified at ONT. REV.
STAT. c.54 (1970)); Business Concerns Records Act, [1957-1958], Que. Stat. c. 42 (1958) (codi-
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States corporations operating in such countries may be placed in the
untenable position of either violating foreign statutes or disobeying a
command of a U.S. governmental authority.8 ' Exacerbating this prob-

lem is the fact that U.S. courts generally do not accept foreign illegality
alone as an acceptable excuse for failure to comply with a subpoena
82
when the court has personal jurisdiction over the person served.

The Justice Department is well aware of foreign reactions to its
attempts to discover documents located abroad, and in one case it was

able to reach formal agreement with a foreign country regarding assistance to be rendered in antitrust investigations.8 3 Moreover, as noted

earlier, 4 the Justice Department has undertaken to notify foreign governments at any time that an Antitrust Division official wishes to con-

duct investigative interviews or other official business within its
territory. Furthermore, the Antitrust Division has pledged to make
every effort to keep requests for foreign evidence to the minimum nec-

essary level, and to tailor what requests are made both to responsible
standards of relevancy, as well as to meet particular difficulties of any
fled at QuE. REV. STAT. c. 278 (1964)); Atomic Energy Control Act, 1970, CAN. REv. STAT. c.
A-19 as implemented by the Uranium Information Security Regulations, STAT. 0. R. 77-836,
111 Can. Gaz. pt. II, at 4619 (1977) (Replacing Uranium Information Security Regulations,
STAT. 0. & R. 76-644, 110 Can. Gaz., pt. II, at 2747 (1976); (2) Great Britain-Shipping
Contracts and Commercial Documents Act of 1964 c. 87, modified by the Transfer of Functions (Shipping and Construction of Ships) Order 1965, 2, 1965 STAT. INST. No. 145, and
MinistrY of Aviation Supply (Dissolution) Order 1971, 2(1), 1971 STAT. INST. No. 719; (3)
Australia-Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, No. 121
(Austl.), as amended by Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Amendment
Act, 1976, No. 202 (Austl.), as implemented by Order of the Attorney General, Austl. Gov't
Gaz. No. S. 214 (Nov. 29, 1976); (4) Netherlands-Sec. 39, Economic Competition Act of
Nov. 14, 1958; (5) Switzerland--Cod. Pen. § 271-4 (Dec. 21, 1937) (as amended); and (6)
South Africa-Sec. 30, Atomic Energy Act, 1967, No. 20, 15 Stat. Repub. So. Afr. 1045
(1977).
For a review of which of these blocking statutes was enacted in direct response to antitrust litigation in U.S. courts in order to prevent what was seen abroad as a U.S. invasion of the territorial
integrity of other nations, see Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in
Andrust Litigation, supra note 74, at 613 n.5.
81 Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Ltigation,
supra note 74, at 612-13.
82 See, e.g., United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. First Nat'l
City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968). Although foreign illegality alone will not absolve a party
from complying with a subpoena, the Supreme Court, in Societe Internationalev. Rogers, 357 U.S.
197 (1958), a civil case, has indicated that where failure to comply with a discovery order is due to
inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith or fault, the noncomplying party will not suffer the
particularly harsh sanction of having its suit dismissed. Id. at 212. For a more complete discussion of this matter, see Note, Foreign NondisclosureLaws andDomestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, note 74 supra.
83 Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June
23, 1976, United States-Canada, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291.
84 See note 61 supra.
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85

RULE OF REASON AND JOINT VENTURES

A fourth area of concern to the business community involves the
uncertainty arising from the application of the "rule of reason" approach to antitrust analyses of overseas activities of U.S. firms,86 particularly those related to international joint ventures. While the
application of the "rule of reason" approach is less severe than the per
se87 application of the antitrust laws,88 concerns are expressed that the
"rule of reason" approach inherently gives rise to such uncertainty that
the proposed transaction might not be concluded in any case.
This concern can be most prominently illustrated in the area of
joint ventures and consortia established between U.S. firms for the purposes of joint selling or other operations abroad, or joint buying from
foreign vendors,89 or such ventures between U.S. and foreign firms
formed in order to establish joint operations either in the United States
85 Shenefield Speech, supra note 62, at 15-16. For example, voluntary instead of compulsory
requests for information from abroad might be utilized where the foreign jurisdiction and parties
are reciprocally cooperative. Id. at 16. Assistant Attorney General Shenefield is not sympathetic
to mechanical application of non-disclosure laws, calling them confrontational, id., and has indicated that, in appropriate cases, where a foreign firm which is the object of discovery has assets in
the United States, the Justice Department will not be reluctant to use the leverage afforded by
those assets in order to force the firm to cooperate in discovery. Shenefield Interview, supra note
63, at AA-6. When circumstances warrant, it will also ask the court to draw negative inferences
with regard to evidence that is not provided, regardless of foreign "blocking statutes." Shenefield
Speech, supra note 62, at 15.
86 Under the "rule of reason" approach, trade restraints are tested by a factual inquiry as to
whether they will have any significantly adverse effect on competition, what the justification for
them is, and whether that justification could be achieved in a less anticompetitive manner. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1911). In the international context, the Department of Justice has indicated that the key inquiries under a rule of reason approach are as follows:
(i) is the anticompetitive restraint ancillary to a lawful main purpose?; (ii) is the scope or duration
of the restraint greater than necessary to achieve that purpose?; and (iii) is the restraint otherwise
reasonable, either alone or in conjunction with other circumstances? See ANTITRUST GUIDE,
supra note 27, at 3-4.
87 Under a per se approach, no inquiry is made as to the economic justification or reasonableness of a certain type of trade restraint, because the courts feel that such restraints have such a
pernicious effect on competition as to make these inquiries not worth the effort. Northern Pac. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Some types of per se violations are: agreements among
competitors to fix prices at which their offerings are sold; agreements among competitors to allocate territories or customers in order to lessen competition; collective refusals to deal; and certain
types of tie-in arrangements.
88 The Department of Justice has stated that the rule of reason may have a somewhat broader
application to international transactions where it is found that (1) experience with adverse effects
on competition is much more limited than in the domestic market, or (2) there are some special
justifications not normally found in the domestic market. See ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 27,
at 2-3, (citing K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 79-84 (1958)).
89 See ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 27, at I.
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or abroad. 90 The specific concerns expressed are that the law in this
area is uncertain, despite the rather straightforward and relatively reassuring discussion of the matter in the Guide,9 1 and that the "potential
entrant" theory sometimes relied on in such cases to show antitrust vio-

lations may be overly restrictive.
The basi problem is that the antitrust propriety of a joint venture

will generally turn on the inherently uncertain "rule of reason" approach described above.92 Under existing case law, such an approach

must simultaneously take into account a whole host of factors, which
do not focus on the ability of U.S. firms to meet foreign competition or
the effect of the joint venture on the international trade position of the
United States. 93 These issues, by their very nature, do not lend themselves to precise resolutions and are potentially confusing. Accord-

ingly, firms may prefer to avoid risking the commencement of an
antitrust action against them rather than to enter into some joint ventures, especially where sensitive diplomatic or political factors may be
involved and the venture involves exchanges of know-how and other
technology.

94

Even if it is decided to proceed with the joint venture, U.S. anti-

trust law may inhibit the potential attractiveness and utility of such
forms of enterprise in an international setting. The "potential entrant"
theory is one such area. Under this theory, a company's joint venture

or merger95 with a large firm in a substantially concentrated market
90 Id.
91 Id. at 19-32 (hypothetical cases C, D, and E).
92 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 995 (1948); United States v. Imperial Chem.
Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
93 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 176-77 (1964), on appealafterremand,
389 U.S. 308 (1967). Although that case involved a domestic joint venture, the factors discussed
therein would likely apply to an international joint venture as well. At a minimum, the factors
which must be considered are as follows:
the number and power of the competitors in the relevant market; the background of their
growth; the power of the joint ventures; the relationship of their lines of commerce; the competition existing between them and the power of each in dealing with the competitors of the
other, the setting in which the joint venture was created; the reasons and necessities for its
existence; the joint venture's line of commerce and the relationship thereof to that of its parents; the adaptability of its line of commerce to noncompetitive practices; the potential power
of the joint venture in the relevant market; an appraisal of what the competition in the relevant market would have been if one of the joint venturers had entered it alone instead of
through the joint venture; the effect, in the event of this occurrence, of the other joint venturer's potential competition; and such other factors as might indicate potential risk to competition in the relevant market.
Id. For a discussion of the antitrust factors involved in an international joint venture context, see
ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 27, at 19-22 (hypothetical case C.).
94 See ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 27, at 28-32, for the Department of Justice's approach to
joint ventures involving exchanges of know-how and other technology.
95 The Justice Department has indicated that it will look at the creation of a joint venture of
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may constitute an antitrust violation if the foreign joint venture or
merger partner at some future date might enter the market either de

novo or through a "toehold" acquisition of a firm lacking a significant
share of the relevant market. 96 In an international context, the problem
with the application of this doctrine is that it may severely restrict the

group from which U.S. firms can select an attractive foreign joint venture or merger partner,9 7 especially if the doctrine is applied to situations where it is not absolutely clear that the foreign company is

planning to enter the U.S. market on its own if it does not join forces

with the U.S. firm in question. 98 This doctrine is of concern to foreign
governments as well as to U.S. businesses. Foreign governments often
cannot understand how a foreign company which has never entered,
nor may not have any intention of entering the U.S. market, can be

considered a competitor in that market merely because of its sales in its
domestic market. 99

The business community notes that these concerns regarding the

establishment and operation of joint ventures are particularly important for U.S. firms under contemporary conditions of international
trade and investment. Given the enormous size of the capital intensive
projects now being undertaken by many of the world's underdeveloped
nations in an attempt to modernize their societies, one firm often can-

not afford or is unwilling to undertake a project on its own. A joint
venture therefore becomes a necessary means of doing business. Furthermore, the foreign country may require, as a condition of the bid,

that a local firm be made a joint venture partner. To the extent U.S.
firms refrain from bidding on such overseas projects or from entering
the more permanent variety as if it were a merger between parties in the field covered by the
venture. Id. at 21.
96 See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); BOC International Ltd. v.
F.T.C., 567 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602,
624 n.25 (1974). The effect of such a joint venture or merger under the "potential entrant" theory
"may be substantially to lessen competition" within the meaning of § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
97 The question of potential entry was recently cited by the Department of Justice as one
reason for opposing a proposed joint venture between General Electric and Hitachi to manufacture and sell television sets in the United States. See Department of Justice Press Release, Nov.
28, 1978; Letter from John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division to James
Bruce, Litigation and Antitrust Counsel, General Electric Company (Nov. 27, 1978).
98 At least one commentator has recommended that the potential competition doctrine be limited to situations in which the foreign company is clearly planning to enter the U.S. market if it
does not merge with a U.S. firm. See Fugate, The Department of Justice'sAntitrust Guidefor
InternationalOperations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 645, 662 (1977). He also recommends that a court
should give full consideration to economic factors that may favor the merger, as well as to potential competition factors that may argue against it. Id.
99 Id. at 661.
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into a joint venture with a local firm because of any antitrust uncer-

tainty surrounding joint ventures, U.S. economic interests are affected,
not the least on account of the anticipated "flow-through" effect on
U.S. exports when U.S. companies engage in business abroad.
THE MULTIFACETED NATURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

The InternationalTrade Commission andSection 337 of the TaryAct
of 1930

The last major area of concern involves the difficulty U.S. firms
face in dealing with the multifaceted nature of antitrust enforcement in

the United States. Allegedly anticompetitive business transactions may
be challenged by several potential litigants. These include private parties,' 00 state attorneys general in the name of their states on behalf 0of2
11
Justice Department,

natural persons residing in their states,

the

the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 0 3 and in certain cases arising
under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 04 the Interna-

tional Trade Commission (ITC). With respect to actions instituted by
the federal government, officials at the Antitrust Division and the FTC

often consult with each other regarding antitrust enforcement activities,
thereby generally avoiding significant duplication resulting from overlapping jurisdiction.0 5 The ITC, however, proceeds on a more independent basis.'0 6
Under section 337, the ITC is authorized to investigate and take
enforcement actions 0 7 against unfair methods of competition or unfair
acts in the importation of articles if the effect or tendency of such meth-

ods or acts, is, inter alia, "to restrain or monopolize trade and com100 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) provides that persons injured by violations of the antitrust laws may
bring suit therefore in U.S. district court without respect to the amount in controversy and may
recover three times the actual damages sustained and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
10 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976).
102 28 U.S.C. §§ 515, 516 (1976).
103 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
104 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976), as amended by Trade Agreements Act of July 26, 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-39, 125 CONG. REC. D1030 (daily ed. July 26, 1979).
105 For a discussion of this consultation process see Letter from John H. Shenefield, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, to Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal 1-2 (June 5, 1979).
106 See Griffin, .4 Critiqueof the Justice Department's Antitrust Guidefor InternationalOperations, 11 CORNELL INT' L.J. 215, 217-19 (1978).
107 Under § 337, if a violation has taken place, the ITC may issue either an exclusion order or a
cease and desist order. Violations of cease and desist orders are subject to a civil fine of not more
than the greater of $10,000 or the domestic value of the articles entered or sold on such day in
violation of the order.
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merce in the United States."' 1 8 Although section 337 has historically

been applied almost exclusively in cases of imports involving alleged
patent infringement, 0 9 actions by the ITC taken since enactment of the
Trade Act of 1974110 prompted, in part, by amendments to section 337
made by that Act, "I'and statements in the legislative history regarding
those amendments, 112 indicate that it has sought to use its authority

under section 337 to deal with antitrust type matters traditionally left to
the Antitrust Division and the FTC. These include consideration of
alleged violations similar to those which might be the basis of an action
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act' 13 and the anti-predatory
pricing provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act.' 14 It has even been
suggested that sections 3115 and 7116 of the Clayton Act also fall within

the scope of ITC activity under section 337.1 17 However, as of July
108 19 U.S.C. § 1337(3) (1976).
109 Prior to 1975, in only two cases did the ITC consider antitrust-type issues in the context of a
§ 337 action. In Watches, Watch Movements and Watch Parts, Investigation No. 337-19 (1966),
boycott, price fixing, and discrimination charges were investigated. In Tractor Parts, Investigation
No. 337-22 (1971), a conspiracy to prevent the importation of certain goods into the United States
was considered.
110 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 19, 26, 31 U.S.C.).
II1 Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 341, 88 Stat. 1978, 2053 (1975). These amendments included: (i)
giving the ITC, instead of the President, final authority to determine whether a violation has
occurred; (ii) providing for investigations of violations to begin under ITC initiative instead of
waiting for the filing of a complaint; (iii) providing for the ITC to receive advice regarding alleged
violations from other government agencies, specifically including the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Department of Justice, and the FTC; (iv) mandating that a final determination of a violation may be made only after an on-the-record hearing held in accordance with the
provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act; (v) adding cease and desist orders as possible
remedies for violations; (vi) mandating that the public health and welfare, competitive conditions
in the U.S. economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles, and U.S. consumers be
considered in determining whether or not to issue exclusion or cease and desist orders in cases of
violations; and (vii) providing for Presidential override, for policy reasons, of an ITC determination.
112 S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 196-97 (1974), states that "[t]he Committee believes
that the public health and welfare and the assurance of competitive conditions in the United
States economy must be the overriding considerations in the administration of this statute."
113 15 U.S.C. §§ I, 2 (1976). See, e.g., Certain Color Television Receiving Sets, Investigation
No. 337-TA-23 (1976); Chicory Roots: Crude and Ground or Otherwise Prepared, Investigation
No. 337-TA-27 (1976).
114 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1976). See, e.g., the investigations cited in note 113, supra; Certain AboveGround Swimming Pools, Investigation No. 337-TA-25 (1976); Certain Welded Stainless Steel
Pipe and Tube, Investigation No. 337-TA-29 (1977).
115 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
116 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
117 See, e.g., Klayman, The United States International Trade Commission: Co-Equal of the
FTC in Regulating Unfair Methods of Competition, 10 LAW. AMERICAS 4, 19-21 (1978). The author is a former employee of the Office of the General Counsel at the ITC.
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1979, no cases had yet been brought alleging the latter two types of
violation.
A recent ITC Chairman set the tone for a more activist Commission by encouraging expanded ITC activity under section 337 into antitrust type matters," 8 arguing that such expanded activity is consistent
with legislative intent and that the ITC need not be bound by precedents set by other regulatory bodies." 9 Rather, he asserted, the ITC120
is
to "provide a new voice in the world of international antitrust law."'
In at least one case, the Commission itself adopted a similar position by
making clear that the provisions
of section 337 are "in addition to any
2
'
law."'
of
provisions
other
This further fragmentation of antitrust enforcement efforts increases the uncertainty for U.S. businesses engaged in international
trade as they are forced to try to understand and deal with possibly
differing enforcement goals and intentions of three federal antitrust enforcement agencies, while potentially being simultaneously subject to
the enforcement jurisdiction of each of them for essentially the same
alleged illegal activity. 122 Additionally, such activities may be subject
to antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings under the jurisdiction of the Commerce Department. 123 The uncertainty is further
heightened since appeals of ITC decisions under section 337 must go to
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 2 4 a court without significant
antitrust background or experience. In contrast, FTC cease and desist
orders are appealable to the various U.S. Courts of Appeals, courts of
general jurisdiction. 12 5 Justice Department civil antitrust actions are,
of course, brought in the general jurisdiction U.S. District Courts, with
appeals going to the U.S. Courts
of Appeals or, in certain cases, directly
126
Court.
Supreme
U.S.
to the
118 Minchew, UnitedStates InternationalTrade Commission: Co-Equalof the FTC in Regulating UnfairMethods of Competition, Forward, 10 LAW. AMERICAS 1, 1-3 (1978). As of July, 1979,
eight cases alleging antitrust type unfair trade practices had been considered by the ITC since
enactment of the Trade Act of 1974.
119 Id.

120 Id.at 1.
121 Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 863, at 14 (1978). See
also 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976).
122 See Griffin, note 106 supra.
123 Antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings are governed by Title VII of the Paris
Act of 1930, as amended, Title I, Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
93 (1979). Administration of these proceedings was shifted from
merce Dep't by Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979,
124 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1976).
125 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
126 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1976). A direct appeal lies directly to the

Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 150the Treasury Dep't to the Com44 Fed. Reg. 69273 (1979).

Supreme Court if, upon proper
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The Justice Department has clearly recognized that a problem ex-

ists. Assistant Attorney General Shenefield has stated that,
[W]e are becoming increasingly worried about the overlapping jurisdiction between ITC enforcement of section 337 and the traditional antitrust
laws enforced by the Department of1Justice,
the Federal Trade Commis27

sion, and private antitrust plaintiffs.
Accordingly, that Department has attempted to make its views known

directly before the ITC.128 For example, in April, 1976, the ITC investigated a matter involving certain stereophonic equipment, in which the
complaints were similar to those involving antitrust violations. 29 Both
the Department of Justice and the FTC urged the ITC to limit its section 337 jurisdiction to cases in which there was a link between the
alleged unfair trade practice and foreign trade. 3° The ITC, however,
asserted jurisdiction even though there was little evidence of a link between the allegedly anticompetitive actions of the importer and his foreign supplier.13

More recently, the Justice Department expressed opposition to the
claims of Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube manufacturers
in their section 337 action, pointing out that vigorous price competition
is not an unfair trade practice.' 32 It further argued that section 337
should be used against articles unfairly imported "only when other enforcement agencies such as the Department of Treasury, the Federal
Trade Commission or the Department of Justice could not obtain in
personam jurisdiction over the offending parties."' 3 3 However, in this
case, as well, the ITC did not agree. In an attempt to improve the situation and to coordinate its international competition advocacy efforts,
application, the district court judge who adjudicated the case enters an order stating that immediate consideration of the appeal by the Supreme Court is of general public importance in the administration of justice.
127 Prepared remarks of John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
ALI-ABA Course of Study on International Antitrust Law, in Washington, D.C., I1 (May 26,
1978).
128 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(2) (1976) requires the ITC, during the course of each investigation
under that section, to consult with and seek advice and information from the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, the Department of Justice, the FTC, and other appropriate departments and agencies.
129 In Certain Electronic Audio and Related Equipment, Investigation No. 337-TA-7 (1976),
the question arose as to whether an importer of equipment who refused to deal with a discounter
transshipper of such equipment violated § 337.
130 These positions were taken in letters filed in response to a request under § 337(b)(2).
131 For a more complete discussion of the matter, see Leonard & Foster, The Metamorphosis of
the U.S InternationalTrade Commission Underthe TradeAct of1974, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 719, 75152 (1976).
132 Prepared remarks of John H. Shenefield, supra note 127, at 9.
133 Letter from Joe Sims, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, to Kenneth R. Mason, Secretary of the U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 2 (Jan.- 13, 1978).
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the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, has created a new position
and appointed a Director of Trade Policy.
In section 337 actions, the Justice Department's role is not limited
to making its views known before the ITC. As a result of amendments
to the statute made by the Trade Act of 1974,134 the President was
given the opportunity to override, for policy reasons, an ITC determination under section 337. As part of the Executive Branch, the Justice
Department advises the President with respect to such matters and accordingly, in cases where the ITC makes what Justice feels to be a determination having potentially anticompetitive effects, Justice will have
a second chance to influence the outcome of the proceeding.' 35 The
fact that Justice has this further opportunity to affect the outcome of a
section 337 action has the potential of limiting the ITC's role as yet
another antitrust enforcement agency. If ITC activities under section
337 involving antitrust type practices result in what Justice feels to be
anticompetitive consequences and Justice is successful in convincing
the President that ITC's action should be overturned for policy reasons,
136
it is likely that ITC activities of an antitrust nature will diminish.
Although the Justice Department has expressed misgivings about
the growing involvement of the ITC in matters traditionally left to
other antitrust enforcement agencies, 37 it is important to note that Justice does not appear to be opposed in principle to the idea of yet another active antitrust enforcement agency. Rather, it opposes an
antitrust enforcement role for the ITC which it would use to accomplish what Justice considers to be anticompetitive purposes and effects.
As Assistant Attorney General Shenefield has noted, "If. . . the ITC
chooses to use the authority Congress has granted it under Section 337
to promote competition, consistent with fair trade practices and existing
law, I would welcome the ITC to the ranks
antitrust and international
38
of antitrust enforcers." 1
134 See note 111 supra.
135 28 U.S.C. §§ 501, 511 (1976).
136 Indeed, on April 22, 1978, President Carter did override the ITC's determination of a violation of§ 337 in Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, citing, inter alia, the need to avoid
duplication and conflicts in the administration of the unfair trade practice laws of the United
States. 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (1978).
137 See text accompanying notes 130-33 supra.

138 Letter from John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, to Senator Jacob
Javits 9 (Sept. 27, 1978), reprintedin 125 CONG. REc. S 4708-10 (daily ed. April 25, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Shenefield Letter].
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Alnti-Boycott Enforcement
The question of the multifaceted nature of antitrust enforcement
of illegal international trade activities has also arisen in connection
with the U.S. government's judicial response to attempts by Arab
League nations to force U.S. firms to comply with a boycott of Israel.
This is exemplified by the position of the Department of Justice in its
response to public comments on the proposed consent judgment which
was filed in United States v. Bechtel Corp.'3 9
The civil complaint in the subject action alleged that the defendants implemented a conspiracy in the United States to refuse to deal
and to require others to refuse to deal with persons and firms which
were blacklisted pursuant to the Arab Boycott of Israel as subcontrac40
tors on major construction projects in Arab League countries.1
Nearly a year after the suit was instituted, a proposed consent judgment was reached,' 4' and in accordance with the provisions of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,142 a competitive impact statement
was filed with the court by the Department of Justice. 143 The proposed
consent judgment prohibited the defendants from continuing the conduct alleged in the complaint to be illegal,'" from entering into agreements to refuse to deal with blacklisted persons and firms in the United
States,14 from refusing to recommend persons and firms as subcontractors on major construction projects in Arab League countries because
such persons and firms are blacklisted, 146 and from maintaining or using blacklists in the United States in connection with major construccomments were solicited regarding the
tion projects. 4 Public
48
judgment.
proposed
Over a year later, the Justice Department filed its response to the
comments received and asked for the court's approval of the proposed
settlement. 149 The delay in filing the response was due to the fact that,
in the interim, Congress carefully considered and enacted far-reaching
anti-boycott legislation as part of the Export Administration Amend139 Civ. No. 76-99 (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 16, 1976).
140 See the summary of the complaint in the introduction to the Proposed Consent Judgment,
42 Fed. Reg. 3716 (1977).
141 Id.
142 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) to (h) (1976).

143 42 Fed. Reg. 3718 (1977).
144 Id. at 3716.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.

148 Id.
149 43 Fed. Reg. 12953 (1978).
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ments of 1977' which required the issuance by the Department of
Commerce of detailed implementing regulations after a period of public comment.151 The Justice Department's response noted that the 1977
Amendments represented an alternative governmental response to enforcement of the Sherman Act against restrictive trade practices relating to foreign boycotts and cited section 4A(a)(4) of the Export

152
Administration Act of 1969, as153amended by the 1977 Amendments
in support of the proposition.
The response went on to emphasize the Justice Department's view

that the proposed consent decree, "reflects the present enforcement pol-

icy of the Antitrust Division with respect to boycott related activities.
Thus, the decree, rather than the 1977 Amendments and ensuing rules,
constitutes the controlling factor in determining whether conduct runs

afoul of the antitrust laws."' 54 What makes this position especially difficult for U.S. business is the fact that in Justice's response it argued

that the proposed consent decree prohibits "a plethora of boycott-implementing activities" authorized under the 1977 Amendments and the

implementing regulations. 5 5 Thus, under Justice's response, businessmen would have to be concerned about differing enforcement goals and

intentions of at least two administrative agencies in arranging business
transactions with boycotting countries. When one also considers the
150 50 U.S.C. § 2403-la (Supp. 1 1977).
151 Id.
152 Id. at § 2403-1a(a)(4). It provides that "[n]othing in this subsection may be construed to
supersede or limit the operation of the antitrust . . . laws of the United States." The Export
Administration Act of 1969, as amended, is codified at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2413 (Supp. I
1977).
153 43 Fed. Reg. 12954 (1977).
154 Id. at 12956.
155 Id. at 12957 n.14. Commerce Department implementing regulations were issued at 43 Fed.
Reg. 3508 (1978) and are codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369 (1979). The "boycott-implementing activities" permitted under the Commerce regulations but not under the proposed consent decree were
described as:
(1) compliance by a U.S. person with the import restrictions of a boycotting country as to
goods and services from a boycotted country or provided by any business concern organized
under the laws of the boycotted country or by nationals or residents of the boycotted country
or prohibiting the shipment of goods to the boycotting country on a carrier of the boycotted
country, or by a route other than that prescribed by the boycotting country or the recipient of
the shipment, whether or not the U.S. person has received a specific request to comply;
(2) compliance with export requirements of the boycotting country with respect to direct
and indirect shipments or transshipments of exports to the boycotted country, or any business
concern, national or resident thereof; and
(3) compliance by a U.S. person resident in a foreign country or agreement by such person
to comply with the laws of that country with respect to his activities exclusively therein governing imports of products for his own use into such country including the performance of
contractual services within that country, even if the U.S. person who is a resident of a foreign
country knows or has reason to know that particular laws are boycott related.
43 Fed. Reg. at 12957 n.14.
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fact that provisions of the Internal Revenue Code deny certain tax ben-

efits to firms participating in international boycott activities 15 6 thereby
involving still another administrative agency (the Treasury Department) with a third set of criteria 157 in reviewing boycott-related activities, the uncertainty and difficulty faced by U.S. businesses in trading
with boycotting countries becomes obvious.
The apparent conflict between the Department of Justice's response and the anti-boycott provisions of the Export Administration
Amendments of 1977 and their implementing regulations, and the resultant inconsistent directives from two separate government agencies
as to rules for doing business with certain Middle Eastern countries,
were cited by Bechtel in objections it filed with the court to the entry of
the proposed consent judgment. 158 However, the court rejected Bechtel's suggestion that the enactment of the 1977 Amendments limited the
operation of the antitrust laws and required the pre-entry modification
of the proposed judgement. 59 It noted the legislative history of the
1977 Amendments which indicated that enactment of that legislation
was not intended to affect the antitrust laws. 6 ' Finally, the court argued that where harmonization was required, it would be more appropirate to direct such efforts to Congress than to a district court
considering a proposed judgment under the strictures of the Antitrust
16 1
Procedures and Penalties Act.
Although the court's decision apparently did little to ease the busi156 I.R.C. §§ 908, 952, 995, 999.
157 The Treasury Department's Boycott Guidelines are found at 41 Fed. Reg. 49923 (1976), 42
Fed. Reg. 1092 (1977), 42 Fed. Reg. 41504 (1977), and 43 Fed. Reg. 3454 (1978). The major
difference between Commerce's anti-boycott regulations and the Treasury Department's Guidelines is that Commerce's regulations allow compliance with local law or agreeing that a host country's laws will apply to a contract (as long as there is no specific reference to a country's boycottrelated laws). Under Treasury's regulations, agreeing to comply generally with a country's laws
may be considered an agreement to participate in a boycott, thereby leading to denial of a tax
benefit. See 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f) (1979); 43 Fed. Reg. 3463 (1977, Boycott Guidelines H-3 and H4).
158 United States v. Bechtel Corp., Civ. No. 76-99, Memorandum of Decision (Jan. 5, 1979),
reprintedin ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 897, E-1 (1979).
159 Id. at E-3. The court noted that until the judgment is entered and implemented, no clear
factual situation sufficient to bring into play the modification provisions of the proposed judgment
would become apparent. The court held that a proceeding to modify may well involve considerations and evidentiary matters which would be beyond the scope of the application for the entry of
the proposed judgment.
160 S. REP. No. 95-104, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 47 (1977).
161 United States v. Bechtel Corp., Memorandum of Decision, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 897, at E-3. Bechtel has filed an appeal with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals from
the District Court's decision entering the consent judgement. Appeal noted, No. 79-4194 (9th Cir.
March 5, 1979).
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ness community's concerns regarding the lack of harmony between the
consent judgment and the 1977 Amendments and implementing regu-

lations, those concerns may have been allayed somewhat by the brief
the Department of Justice filed in reply to Bechtel's motion objecting to

the entry of the consent judgement.

62

In that brief, Justice conceded

that the statement in its Response to the public comments on the proposed consent decree that the decree represents the "present enforcement policy of the Antitrust Division with respect to boycott related
activities" "may be subject to misinterpretation" and seemed to describe the proposed decree as being limited to the specific facts of the
case. 6 3 The brief further noted that "it would be inappropriate to...

conclude that any single type of conduct prohibited by the decree
would necessarily provide an independent basis for an antitrust prosecution standing by itself."'" Finally, the reply brief stated that there is
only one point in which the decree and Commerce's anti-boycott regulations are inconsistent. 6- That point was the use to which Bechtel and

its subsidiaries could put a blacklist in procuring goods and services for
major construction projects on behalf of an Arab client. The decree
prohibits the use of such a blacklist. 66 Commerce's regulations permit
U.S. subsidiaries resident in Arab League countries to use a blacklist in

compliance with local law when procuring goods
for incorporation into
67
turnkey projects being built for Arab clients.'
THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE

The Department of Justice has not only consistently rejected the
premise that the operation of the antitrust laws represents an impediment to U.S. foreign trade in general and to expanded exports in particular,

68

but has also argued that these laws positively enhance the

162 Plaintiffs Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion for Entry of the Final Judgment, United
States v. Bechtel Corp., Civ. No. 76-99 (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 16, 1976).
163 Id. at 17 n.22.
164 Id. at 18 n.22. Assistant Attorney General Shenefield, in an interview, clarified this point by
indicating that the case was sui generis and that Justice has "no desire to hold U.S. businesses up
to some standard under the antitrust laws that is contradicted by congressional statute or even
regulations issued under that statute." Shenefield Interview, supra note 63, at AA-6.
165 Plaintiffs Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion for Entry of the Final Judgment, United
States v. Bechtel Corp., Civ. No. 76-99 (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 16, 1976), at 15. But see note 155
supra for three potential conflicts between the consent decree and the Commerce Department's
regulations.
166 42 Fed. Reg. 3717 (1977).
167 15 C.F.R. pt. 369 (1979).
168 See, e.g., Letter from Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Kauper to Arch N. Booth,
President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, reprinted in Hearings, supra note I1, at 172 [hereinafter
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export opportunities of U.S. business. 169 Justice Department spokesmen point out that despite vast efforts, neither the NAM, nor the
Chamber of Commerce, nor the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly, nor other interested and capable parties have been able to
bring forward concrete examples of harm resulting from the application of the antitrust laws to actions in U.S. foreign commerce.'7 0 With
particular respect to exports, they further note that no joint venture or
bidding arrangement involving American firms selling to foreigners has
been the subject of either government prosecution or private litigation
for over twenty years. 171 Moreover, the antitrust laws, it is argued, promote exports by protecting exporters against efforts to injure or limit
72
their exports by anticompetitive conduct.'
Finally, Justice Department officials offer two explanations as to
why the antitrust laws are perceived by the business community as
presenting a problem for U.S. foreign trade.' 7 3 First, they state that
there are often a variety of reasons, totally unrelated to the antitrust
laws, why a U.S. firm which has entered into joint venture negotiations
may not wish to conclude the transaction. ' 7 To state openly the real
reasons for not concluding the transaction may unnecessarily offend
the foreign firm. In such case, the antitrust laws become a convenient
excuse for not proceeding with the transaction. Second, it is argued
that antitrust laws are a convenient excuse for poor export performance
resulting in reality from a firm's unwillingness to devote sufficient resources and time to develop and understand foreign markets, or from
U.S. industry's insufficient ability to obtain the aggressive support of
U.S. commercial agencies to aid in overcoming non-tariff barriers to
17 5
foreign markets.
Apparently in an effort to substantiate its assertion that the antitrust laws are not an impediment to U.S. foreign trade, the Justice Department has undertaken several efforts in recent years to resolve any
perceptions in the business community that the antitrust laws represent
such an impediment. First, after publication of the Chamber of Coincited as Kauper Letter]; Shenefield Interview, supra note 63, at AA-3; Shenefield Letter, note 138
supra.
169 Prepared remarks of John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division
Before the National Governors Association/White House Seminar on International Trade 1 (June
6, 1979).
170 Shenefield Letter, supra note 138, at 3.
171 Kauper Letter, supra note 168, at 1.
172 Prepared remarks of John H. Shenefield, supra note 169, at 1.
173 Shenefield Letter, supra note 138, at 3-4.
174 Id.
175 Id.
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merce's 1974 Report on "U.S. Antitrust Laws and American Ex-

ports",' 76 former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Thomas
Kauper, in a letter to the Chamber's President, attempted to refute,
point-by-point, the allegations made in that report. 17 7 Second, Justice
Department representatives have met with some of the nation's leading
businessmen to explain the application of the antitrust laws to the inter-

national operations of U.S. firms.' 78 Most importantly, on January 26,
1977, it published an "Antitrust Guide for International Operations"
containing fourteen hypothetical fact situations involving potential ap-

plication of U.S. antitrust laws to various types of international busi79
ness activities and detailed antitrust analyses of those hypotheticals. 1
RECOMMENDATIONS

The preceding discussion has made one point abundantly clear-

the business community and the nation's antitrust enforcers have very
different perceptions as to the effect of U.S. antitrust laws on U.S. foreign trade and investment. The business community sees the application of U.S. antitrust laws as inhibiting its international operations.
The Justice Department believes that those laws present no such impediment and in fact enhance the export opportunities of U.S. firms.
In this controversy, the business community has always been vulnerable to the charge that it has been unable to support its allegations
with concrete examples of the detrimental effects that the antitrust laws
have had.'8 0 It has indeed been hard to identify such examples because, as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has noted,' 8 ' it is difficult to

confirm antitrust considerations as controlling in a decision not to undertake an international business venture or in impeding the interna-

tional operations of an ongoing enterprise.

While antitrust

176 See note 12 supra.
177 Kauper Letter, note 168 supra.
178 See, e.g., remarks of Joel Davidow, then Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, before the March 10, 1976, Meeting of the Advisory Committee
on East-West Trade, reprintedin U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ANTITRUST IN EAST-WEST

TRADE (1976).
179 See note 27 supra. The Bureau ofMiner Report, supra note 23, at 205, as well as recent
discussions with leading members of the antitrust bar indicate that the Antitrust Guide seems useful to the business community as a nonbinding indication of the Antitrust Division's enforcement
intentions. However, it should be noted that at least one commentator has criticized the Antitrust
Guide for failing to explain adequately what it was and was not intended to be. Griffin, supra
note 106, at 217. He states that this failing may mislead some readers and may result in their not
comprehending the significance of the Antitrust Guide's silence on some issues and very brief caveats in others. Id.
180 See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
181 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
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considerations are probably a factor in such situations, they may not be
1 82
the decisive factor. But a few such examples do exist.

The Department of Justice, even though it has contended there has
been little or no substance to the business community's allegations, has
undertaken a concerted effort in recent years to try to eliminate that
community's concerns with antitrust uncertainty over the application of
the antitrust laws to U.S. foreign trade and investment. But as the first
182 In addition to those examples discussed at notes 58, 59, and 97, supra, the authors would
note the following:
(i) Several years ago, Pratt and Whitney, a U.S. manufacturer of jet aircraft engines, was
effectively prevented from entering into a joint venture with a British firm, Rolls Royce Ltd., to
develop engines for executive jets after receiving informal Justice indications that such a venture
would be prosecuted. A reworked proposal involving Pratt and Whitney's Canadian subsidiary
was also thwarted by Justice because the great bulk of the output of the joint venture was to be
exported from Canada to the United States. This position was taken despite the fact that the
Canadian Government actively supported the joint venture and the Canadian Director of Investigation and Research did not see it as raising problems under the Combines Investigation Act,
CAN. REV. STAT. c. C-23 (1970), as amended by Can. Stat. 1974-75-76, c. 76, a Canadian antitrust
statute. See Prepared remarks of Robert J. Bertrand, Director of Investigation and Research
Under the Combines Investigation Act and Ass't. Deputy Minister, Competition Policy, Canadian
Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Fordham Corporate Law Institute on International Antitrust 34 (Nov. 14, 1978). The inability of Pratt and Whitney to enter the Canadian joint
venture has likely resulted in lost U.S. exports because foreign investments by U.S. firms such as
those proposed in this case can often have a "flow-through" effect on U.S. exports. To the best of
our knowledge, Pratt and Whitney has not gone ahead with development of those engines on its

own.
(ii) In October 1977 the Antitrust Division brought a civil antitrust suit against the N.Y.
Coffee and Sugar Exchange and its two committees which set the daily value--or spot price-of
raw sugar. United States v. New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, Inc., No. 77 Civ. 5038
(S.D.N.Y.,filed 1977). That price apparently is used as a reference point for negotiation by private parties of standard contracts for the purchase and sale of sugar. Justice alleged that the daily
price was set "arbitrarily" on the basis of consensus and collective judgment of a small number of
competing firms without historical or technical bases, in violation of § I of the Sherman Act. In
November, 1977, the exchange voluntarily stopped quoting a spot price. Consequently, millions
of dollars of contracts for raw and refined cane sugar had to be renegotiated, resulting in major
disruptions in the sugar trade. In addition, disruptions arose because of the dependence of the
International Sugar Agreement on the quote to determine the quantities that member countries
are allowed to export. Finally, since the N.Y. Exchange stopped quoting a spot price, the setting
of world reference prices for sugar was transferred to three British merchant houses in London.
Justice attorneys reportedly admitted that they were unaware of the complexities of the sugar
trade at the time they filed the antitrust suit. A settlement has been reached in the litigation with a
consent judgment permitting the exchange to quote a spot price for raw sugar based on a formula
established in the judgment. See Competitive Impact Statementfled by the Justice Department, 43
Fed. Reg. 60345 (1978); Martin, U.S. Suit Against Sugar Exchange FrustratesTradersandBureaucrats, Wall St. J., March 22, 1978, at 32, col. 2; Sullivan, Antitrust Suit Triggers Sugar Contracts
Furor,Wash. Post, Feb. 1, 1978, at D13, col. 2-3.
(iii) The third example involved an attempt by the National Constructors Association to
form an association under the Webb-Pomerene Act to compete against government assisted foreign consortia in the export of certain technology. The plan was not implemented when the Department of Justice opined that such exports do not fall within that Act's antitrust exemption. For
further information regarding this matter, see note 211 infra.
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part of this article has attempted to show, the business community's
uncertainties in this area continue to exist. President Carter explicitly
recognized this uncertainty in the area of international joint ventures in
his National Export Policy Statement of September, 1978.183
These concerns and their relationship to the U.S. trade deficit,
however, should not be overstated. As the Bureau of Mines Report has
indicated, antitrust considerations are certainly not an insurmountable
barrier to increased international trade and investment by U.S.
firms.' 84 Moreover, the antitrust laws are but one factor in a whole
array of U.S. government laws and regulations which have an impact
upon the ability of U.S. firms to compete in international markets. 18 5
Finally, the business community may be too ready to use its concerns
as a basis for arguing that its international operations should be subject
to a less restrictive antitrust standard than that which applies in domestic transactions." 6 Such an approach is neither mandated by the facts
nor necessary to deal effectively with the problem. Rather, many of the
business community's concerns can be effectively dealt with by taking
certain steps to eliminate whatever antitrust uncertainty it now faces in
exporting and other international operations. It is for this purpose that
the following recommendations are offered for consideration.
Business Review Procedure
The first set of recommendations relates to the Justice Department's Business Review Procedure,"' under which the Antitrust Division states, in writing, upon receipt of a request for such a statement, its
present enforcement intention with respect to proposed business conduct. After receipt of such a request, which must describe the proposed
conduct in detail, the Antitrust Division will usually commence an investigation into the matter. It will respond to the request in about six
weeks in cases involving mergers and in somewhat more time in cases
involving other types of proposed transactions. 8 8 A similar procedure
183 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1631, 1634 (1978).
184 See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
185 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78m, 78ff (Supp. I
1977), is an example of but one such law.
186 See text accompanying notes 15-22 supra; sez also U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE FINAL
REPORT (proposing an exemption for American exporters and overseas contractors from U.S. antitrust laws insofar as their activities are limited to operations designed to increase the volume of
American exports), note 12 supra.
187 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1978).
188 Hearings,supra note 11, at 1425 (citing Comegys, Business Reviews bytheAntilrust Division,
Conference Board Record 22-23, March 1974).
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is used by the FTC.'8 9
Despite the apparent attractiveness of such a procedure, the business community has not made as much use of it as one might expect.
The Justice Department has acted on some 230 Business Review Procedure requests over the years,' 90 or about twenty per year. More significantly for our purposes, between January 1, 1968, and September 1,
1979, only about twenty-seven such requests dealt with questions concerning the international operations of U.S. firms, and six of those dealt
with the same transaction.'19 Justice Department spokesmen have indicated that constructive suggestions to increase use of the Business Review Procedure would be welcomed.'9 2
While the business community, as a general matter, is undoubtedly apprehensive about giving an antitrust enforcement agency an opportunity to scrutinize a proposed transaction for fear of drawing
attention to that activity, there appear to be at least two specific substantive reasons for lack of interest in the Business Review Procedure.
The first problem involves the time taken by the Antitrust Division to
respond to a Business Review Procedure request. United States firms
engaging in international negotiations, often against foreign cartels
which are able to make and execute business decisions rapidly cannot,
if they wish to remain competitive, wait six weeks or more for a response to such a request from the Antitrust Division. The result is that
possibly profitable business ventures may be abandoned or otherwise
lost because of the uncertainty. 9 3 The time taken to respond to Business Review Procedure requests also may make U.S. companies less
desirable as partners in joint ventures with foreign firms because in
cases where the venture depends upon a favorable response to a Busiwith
ness Review Procedure request, they cannot commit themselves
94
require.'
may
firm
foreign
the
which
speed
and
the certainty
While the Justice Department, in certain cases, is prepared to work
with requesting companies to provide them with a Business Review
Procedure statement in an appropriate period of time so that business
189 16 C.F.R. § 1.1-1.4 (1978), as amended 44 Fed. Reg. 21624 (1979) and 44 Fed. Reg. 23515
(1979).
190 Prepared remarks of John H. Shenefield Before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Na-

tional Institute on Preventive Antitrust 5 (May 31, 1979).
191 Review by one of the authors of Business Review Procedure requests on public file at the
Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
192 See, e.g., remarks of Joe Sims, Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the 17th Annual Advanced Antitrust Law Seminar on International Trade and the Antitrust Laws, Practicing Law
Institute, San Francisco, Cal., (Jan. 20, 1978).
193 BUREAU OF MINES REPORT, supra note 23, at 214.
194 Id.
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opportunities will not be lost,' 95 without a more consistently stream-

lined procedure, the business community has continued to perceive the
usually extensive time involved in receiving a response to be a significant disincentive to making use of the Business Review Procedure.' 9 6
In this light, if the Business Review Procedure is to be more widely

used by U.S. businesses in their international dealings, some type of
consistently more expeditious procedure is probably needed. President

Carter explicitly recognized this point in his September 1978 National
Export Policy Statement when he instructed the Justice Department "to

give expedited treatment to requests by business firms for guidance on
antitrust issues under the Department's Business Review
international
97
1
Program."
In response to the President's directive, on December 6, 1978, the
Justice Department announced a policy to expedite responses to Business Review Procedure requests concerning export-related activities. 19

It committed itself to answer such requests within 30 business days
from the date the Antitrust Division receives all relevant data concern-

ing the proposed transaction. Under the announced policy, an applicant seeking expedited treatment must indicate the manner in which
the request is export-related and expedited treatment will apply only to
those requests that the Division determines to be export-related. Assis-

tant Attorney General Shenefield has announced that his goal is to accord this treatment to all standard Business Review Procedure
requests. 199

While a public commitment by the Justice Department to respond
to export-related Business Review Procedure requests within a stated

period of time is certainly a positive development, it is doubtful that the
195 Shenefield Interview, supra note 63, at AA-4.
196 REPORT OF THE BUSINESS ADVISORY PANEL ON ANTITRUST EXPORT ISSUES (Jan. 10, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as BUSINESS ADVISORY PANEL REPORT], reprintedin 2 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 295 (Jan. 22, 1979) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL COMMISSION

REPORT]. The National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures was established by President Carter under Exec. Order No. 12022, 42 Fed. Reg. 61441 (1977), to study and
make recommendations on (1) revision of procedural and substantive rules of law to expedite the
resolution of complex antitrust cases and development of proposals for making remedies available
in such cases more effective and (2) the desirability of retaining the various exemptions and immunities from the antitrust laws. The National Commission's membership was expanded from 15 to
22 members by Exec. Order No. 12052, 43 Fed. Reg. 15133 (1978). The eight member Business
Advisory Panel on Antitrust Export Issues was established by President Carter on October 27,
1978 to assist the National Commission.
197 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1631, 1634 (1978).

198 Department of Justice Press Release (Dec. 6, 1978).
199 Prepared remarks of John H. Shenefield Before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, National Institute on Preventive Antitrust 6 (May 31, 1979).
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response time to which the Justice Department has committed itself
will solve the problem described. Indeed, in the first six months that
the new policy was in effect, the Justice Department received only one
export-related Business Review Procedure request.2 0 0
As noted above,2 0 in the past, the Antitrust Division has usually
taken approximately thirty business days to respond to Business Review Procedure requests. The new policy, then, only commits the Justice Department to respond to such requests in the same time period it
has usually taken for such processing. Without a more expeditious
treatment of requests concerning export-related activities, the new policy is unlikely to result in significantly greater use of the Business Review Procedure. For this purpose, Justice should publicly commit itself
to respond to Business Review Procedure requests within fifteen business days after all relevant documentation has been provided by the
requestor. Moreover, the Justice Department should proceed as rapidly as possible to expand its new policy to include Business Review
Procedure requests involving any type of proposed transaction. At a
minimum, it should be expanded to include requests dealing with all
types of proposed international trade and investment transactions.
Second, a statement made by the Antitrust Division pursuant to
the Business Review Procedure declares the enforcement intention of
the Division only as of the date of the letter. The regulations state that
"the Division remains completely free to bring whatever action or proceeding it subsequently comes to believe is required by the public interest."20 Although the regulations further state that the Division has
never exercised its right to bring a criminal action where there has been
a full and true disclosure at the time of presenting the request, 20 3 a
company contemplating a proposed transaction can hardly be put fully
at ease by a statement that the Antitrust Division has no present enforcement intention with respect thereto. Not only would the company
not be insulated from future antitrust actions brought by the Justice
Department,204 the FTC, the ITC, or State Attorneys General, but,
more importantly, the potential of private parties filing treble damage
actions is not at all affected by an Antitrust Division statement that it
has no present enforcement intention regarding the proposed course of
200
201
202
203
204

Prepared remarks of John H. Shenefield, supra note 169, at 8.
See text accompanying note 188 supra.
28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1978).
Id. at § 50.6(9) (1978).
It should, however, be noted that absent a misstatement of facts or a dramatic change in

circumstances, Justice is not likely to bring suits challenging actions which it previously stated it
did not plan to challenge. See Shenefield Interview, supra note 63, at AA-4.
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conduct.2 °5 Indeed, such actions are increasing as companies are realizing that they give them a potentially potent competitive weapon.20 6

In view of the fact that decisions to initiate private suits do not
take into account considerations of public policy, and in order to in-

crease antitrust certainty for the business community in its international operations, consideration should be given to removing the

statutory right to a private antitrust action, or perhaps reducing possible damage awards from treble to single,20 7 in cases where the Justice

Department responds favorably to a request under a revised Business
Review Procedure-provided, of course, that the company's actions remain within the parameters indicated in its request. Similarly, to deal
with some of the business community's difficulties arising from the
multifaceted nature of antitrust enforcement and the other antitrust un-

certainties which they perceive, consideration should also be given to
insulating a firm receiving a favorable response to a request under a
revised Business Review Procedure from antitrust actions by all federal

and state authorities-provided again that the firm's actions remain
within the parameters indicated in its request.
While consideration should be given to applying these suggestions
to all requests involving international trade and investment-related

transactions, as a first step,20 8 they might be applied only to requests
regarding export-related transactions. If such application proves suc205 The problem of inadequate protection from the possibility of future public and private
antitrust actions was specifically cited by the Business Advisory Panel on Antitrust Export Issues.
See 2 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 196, at 295.
206 While in 1960, only 228 private treble damage actions were filed in U.S. courts (Remarks of
Professor Milton Handler, before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Dec. 1978,
reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 892, F-l, F-24 (1978)), by 1977 the
number had risen to 1,537. In 1978, 1,270 such actions were fied. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 901, A-20 (1979). Discussions with businessmen and antitrust counsel have disclosed that firms may now even be commencing private antitrust actions without realistically expecting a favorable decision on the merits, because they hope to reach an early settlement with
defendants. Motivation for agreeing to an early settlement stems from the costly and time consuming aspects of defending against a private antitrust suit.
207 Assistant Attorney General Shenefield has reportedly considered proposing legislation to
reduce potential private damage awards from treble to single, upon certification of the attorney
general, in cases where corporations voluntarily confess to having participated in price-fixing conspiracies. See Conspiraciesand Confessions, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 928, at
A-25 (1979).
208 The authors recognize that these suggestions raise some potential problems, not the least of
which may be to inhibit rapid processing of Business Review Procedure requests, in part, as a
result of the likely necessity of providing other agencies and private parties the opportunity to be
heard on the request in question since any ruling would be binding upon them. Because certain
exporting activities are already protected by the antitrust exemption of the Webb-Pomerene Act,
export-related transactions may raise the fewest problems. Consideration might also be given to
the possibility of having two types of business review procedures. One would be an expedited
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cessful, it might then be expanded to other international trade and investment transactions.
It should be stressed that these suggestions have not been offered
with the goal of reducing vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws
either by public or private parties. Such laws represent an important
national policy of promoting competition and strong and effective antitrust enforcement, including private treble damage actions to deter anticompetitive activities should clearly be supported. Rather, they will
allow businesses to proceed expeditiously in their business negotiations
with some sense of antitrust certainty regarding those transactions
which are the subject of a favorable Business Review Procedure statement.
Webb-Pomerene Act
The next set of suggestions involves the Webb-Pomerene Act.2" 9
That Act provides an exemption from the Sherman Act and section 7 of
the Clayton Act for activities of associations of United States firms engaged solely in "export trade."2 ' Exports of services and other intangibles such as technology are not included within this definition. 2 "I
To be eligible for the antitrust exemption, the Act requires that U.S.
companies organized in associations refrain from artificially or intentionally enhancing or depressing U.S. domestic prices of commodities
of the class exported by the association, or from substantially lessening
competition in the United States, and prohibits restraints on the export
trade of any domestic competitor of the association.21 2
fifteen business day procedure under the present rules and another, longer procedure would have
a binding effect on other agencies and private parties.
209 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976).
210 Id. at §§ 62, 63. The Act defines, "export trade" as:
trade or commerce in goods, wares, or merchandise exported, or in the course of being exported from the United States or any Territory thereof to any foreign nation; but the words
"export trade" shall not be deemed to include the production, manufacture, or selling for
consumption or for resale, within the United States or any Territory thereof, of such goods,
wares, or merchandise, or any act in the course of such production, manufacture, or selling
for consumption or for resale.
Id. at § 61.
211 In 1967, in response to a request from the FTC which was prompted by an application from
the National Constructors Association to form a Webb-Pomerene Association to export technology consisting of know-how, blueprints, drawings, and construction plans, the Justice Department
opined that such exports did not come within the Act's definition of "goods, wares or merchandise." Justice's opinion was based on an examination of the Act's legislative history and judicial
interpretation of similar terms in other statutes. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS: CLARIFYING WEBB-POMERENE ACT NEEDED TO HELP INCREASE U.S. EXPORTS

12, 29-30 (No. B-172255) (Aug. 22, 1973).
212 15 U.S.C. §§ 62, 63 (1976).
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Webb-Pomerene associations are made up of private U.S. firms
which are prohibited, either individually or collectively, from agreeing

with foreign producers about prices or market shares in international
trade.2 t3 The Act provides investigative authority to detect associations
whose activities exceed those permitted under the Act. For example, in
order to receive the benefit of this exemption, the Act requires every
Webb-Pomerene association to file with the FTC, within 30 days after
its creation and annually thereafter, a verified written statement setting
forth certain identifying information.21 4 The Attorney General may
also conduct an independent investigation when he believes the activi-

ties of the association go beyond the scope of the exemption, and if an
antitrust violation is believed to exist, remedial action may be under-

taken.215 Such measures may be taken regardless of whether there has
been any investigation, recommendation, or referral by the FTC.2 16

Since the Act was passed in 1918, there has been a slow, but fairly
steady decline in the number of Webb-Pomerene associations registered with the FTC. The greatest number of registered associations88-existed in 1919.217 While some fluctuation has occurred over the

last 15 years, the number of associations has remained fairly constant.
As of October 30, 1978, 32 associations were still registered with the
Federal Trade Commission. 1 8 The evidence of slow decline in use of

the Act based on the number of registered associations is confirmed by
213 United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
The court held that "international agreements between defendants allocating exclusive markets,
assigning quotas in sundry markets, fixing prices on an international scale, and selling through
joint agents are not those 'agreements in the course of export trade' which the Webb Act places
beyond the reach of the Sherman Law." Id. at 70. Accordingly, activities of Webb-Pomerene
associations are not comparable to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries or certain
other international producer cartels.
214 15 U.S.C. § 65 (1976). If the FTC has reason to believe that the association is operating
beyond the scope of the limited exemption, it may investigate and recommend a readjustment of
the business of the association to conform with the law. Id. If such recommendation is not followed, the FTC is to refer the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action. Id.
215 United States Alkali Export Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945).
216 Id.at 205.
217 Between 1921 and 1950, except for seven years during the Depression, registered associations numbered between 50 and 64. In 1950, the total fell to 49 and by 1960 it had dropped to 40.
Further decreases occurred in the early 1960's. By 1965, registered associations numbered only 32.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, WEBB-POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS: A 50 YEAR REVIEw, App. C-I
(Gov't Printing Office 1967) (staff report).
218 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, WEBB-POMERNE ASSOCIATIONS: TEN YEARS LATER 6 (un-

published staff report submitted Nov. 1978). As of July, 1979, the FTC had not yet formally
adopted the staff analysis. Accordingly, the views expressed in the analysis are those of the FTC
staff and do not necessarily represent those of the FTC or any Commission member. It should be
noted that not all registered associations have provided assistance to their members during the
year of registration. For example, in 1960 only 26 out of the 40 registered associations reported
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statistics on the percentage of U.S. exports accomplished through associations.2 19

Although Webb-Pomerene associations may never account for a
large percentage of exports of U.S. manufacturers, certain types of
firms have found a Webb-Pomerene association to be a useful vehicle
for conducting their export operations.2 2 ° Other firms and industries
could also be expected to take advantage of the exemption in order to
increase their exports if the Act's definition of "export trade" would be
broadened to include services such as those related to architecture, engineering, construction, training, finance, insurance, and project or general management, as well as know-how incidental to the sale of goods,
wares, merchandise or services. The fact that such exports are not presently included within the exemption can only be considered an anomaly, since there appears to be no logical basis for distinguishing
providing some form of assistance to their members. As of October 30, 1978, 29 out of the 32
registered associations were active.
219 The highest percentage of U.S. exports assisted by Webb-Pomerene associations occurred in
1930 when 17.5% of U.S. exports were accomplished through such associations. By 1962, the
percentage had fallen to 2.3 as Webb-Pomerene associations accounted for $499 million of total
U.S. exports of $21.4 billion. The percentage rose to 3.5 in 1971, but by 1976 it had declined again
to 1.5, as Webb-Pomerene associations directly or indirectly assisted $1.725 billion of total U.S.
exports of $114 billion. See DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN BUSINESS PRACTICESMATERIALS ON PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF EXPORTING, INTERNATIONAL LICENSING AND INVESTING
56 (1975); WEBB-POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS: A 50 YEAR REVIEW, supra note 217, at 36; WEBBPOMERENE ASSOCIATIONS: TEN YEARS LATER, .supra note 218, at 15.

220 Firms most commonly benefitting from associations are those which deal in homogeneous
or standardized products such as sulfur, potash, phosphate rock and plywood. See WEBB-POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS: A 50 YEAR REVIEW, supra note 217, at 49. Because of the general lack of
differentiation in such fungible, non-trademarked type products, individual producers acting
alone are hard-pressed to increase exports relative to their domestic competitors. On the other
hand, manufacturers of highly differentiated trademarked products generally have little reason to
join together in an association in which the competitive advantages gained by their products'
consumer familiarity will be of little value. Successful Webb-Pomerene associations also exist in
the textile machinery, machine tool, and motion picture fields. Finally, it should be noted that
recently, interest has been increasing in using the export trade exemption to assist marketing
among manufacturers or sellers of complementary products to meet increased foreign competition
for large purchase orders and contracts, including turnkey construction products for entire manufacturing plants in the tire manufacturing and textile mill industries. Increased interest has also
been shown in the possibility of using the exemption to form shippers' councils to negotiate with
shipowners and shipping conferences on rates as well as other matters. See WEBB-POMERENE
ASSOCIATIONS: TEN YEARS LATER, supra note 218, at 16.

The advantages which the Act provides member associations include: centralizing sales efforts; eliminating destructive competition by economically potent foreign buyers; supplying information to members; exploiting members' products abroad; improving product quality, acquiring
added prestige in dealing with official or quasi-official buyers; and gaining access to new markets.
See HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, Foreign Trade, 1679 (1955) (testimony of Earl W. Kintner).
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2
between goods and services.
Such an exemption is needed to remove the antitrust uncertainty
surrounding joint efforts by U.S. firms to export services.22 2 It would
clearly enable U.S. firms wishing to become engaged in major overseas
projects, particularly in the construction and allied service industries, to
submit a single joint bid, thereby lowering each company's cost per bid.
Such costs, when bids are made on an individual firm basis, can occa21

sionally reach several hundred thousand dollars per company. Smaller
companies are often unable to support such marketing efforts alone.
Even more importantly, such an expanded exemption would allow U.S.
firms to deal more effectively with foreign state-controlled buying
agencies 223 and to compete more efficaciously against foreign consortia,22 4 by providing them with the clear legal assurance they need to

join together to provide, at a competitive price, the variety and quantity
of products and services so often demanded in connection with major

foreign projects-a concept similar to that of the trading company
which has been so usefully employed by the Japanese. 25 In recent
I NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 196, at 304; BUSINESS ADVISORY PANEL
196, at 298. Both the Business
Advisory Panel and the National Commission recommended that the Webb-Pomerene Act's antitrust exemption be expanded to include services. However, the National Commission's recommendation was coupled with a proposal to make the exemption contingent upon a showing of
need, as well as a call for legislative reexamination of the necessity of an antitrust exemption for
joint exporting activities. The Business Advisory Panel rejected a recommendation that the
Webb-Pomerene exemption be made contingent upon a showing of particularized need. See I
NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 196, at 302-04; 2 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 196, at 297-98.
222 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 211, at 12.
223 Hearings on S. 864, S. 1499 and S. 1663, supra note 22, at 14 (statement of the National
Association of Manufacturers).
224 The problem of competing against foreign consortia was a major reason for enactment of
the Webb-Pomerene Act. 55 Cong. Rec. 7515 (1917); H.R. REP. No. 1056, 64th Cong. 3d Sess.
(1917); H.R. REP. No. 50, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1917). In United States v. Concentrated
Phosphate Export Ass'n, Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 206 (1968), the Court stated that, in passing the act
"Congress felt that American firms needed the power to form joint export associations in order to
221 See

REPORT, reprintedin2 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note

compete with foreign cartels." For a review of the stiff competition U.S. construction companies

presently face from foreign government-sponsored consortia see the letter from Robert M. Gants,
Vice President, Government Relations, National Constructors Association to Rufus Phillips,
Chairman, Business Advisory Panel to the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws
and Procedures 2-3 (Dec. 1, 1978).
225 The Stevenson Report, supra note 7, at 24, suggests that the Webb-Pomerene antitrust exemption, even if it is expanded to include services, may not provide enough legal protection for
the organization of firms on the trading company concept. That report advocates clear modification of antitrust law to permit formation of trading companies which would be able to organize
the exporting efforts of small and inexperienced U.S. firms, to conduct marketing on a global
basis, and to absorb exchange rate fluctuations, as the Korean and Japanese trading companies
do. Indeed, Senator Stevenson has recently introduced a bill, S. 1663, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979),
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years, there have been several legislative proposals to add services to
the Webb-Pomerene antitrust exemption.2 2 6 None has been enacted.
Although the Justice Department supported one legislative proposal in 1973 to include services within the scope of the Webb-Pomerene
exemption, 227 it has generally opposed any expansion of the exemption
and recently has argued strongly for its repeal. 2 8 It opposes the
amendment of the statute to include services within the exemption as
being unnecessary because there have been no cases challenging practices which such an amended exemption would expressly permit, and

because activities permitted by the exemption are "unlikely" to be objectionable from an antitrust standpoint.2 9
While such statements are somewhat reassuring, they are hardly
sufficient, absent a statutory exemption, for the business community, to

engage in joint exporting activities that may have anticompetitive consequences only in foreign markets, without fear of antitrust repercussions. One reason is that the Justice Department's view that the
Sherman Act's proscriptions do not cover joint activities in the United
States which have anticompetitive consequences only in foreign markets is not settled law and is not universally shared.2 3 ° While firms

engaging in joint exporting activities which have such consequences
may not need to fear a Justice Department enforcement action, they
would not be immune to an FTC enforcement action or private treble
damage actions which might raise this question. The nature of anti-

trust litigation is such that if a suit is instituted-whether by an antitrust enforcement agency, or by a private plaintiff-the defendant will
have a serious, expensive and long-term problem. Without a statutory
which would expressly permit formation of such trading companies and provide an antitrust exemption for their activities.
226 S. 1744, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 1499, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979); S. 864, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 2700, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. 1973, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975);
S. 1486, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. 1774, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); S. 1483, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); S. 4120, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 5061, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R.
11375, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 9445, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
227 S. 1774, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) was the proposal supported. See Kauper Letter in
Hearings,supra note II, at 176, 177.
228 See, e.g., Shenefield Interview, supra note 63, at AA-3.
229 Id. See also ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 27, at 4; Prepared remarks of Ky P. Ewing, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, before the Subcomm. on Int'l Finance of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Sept. 18, 1979, at 5-6. We note that the
careful use by the Justice Department of the word "unlikely" is itself likely to create uncertainty in
the minds of prudent antitrust counsel.
230 Rahl, American .4nirustand Foreign Operations. *hat Is Covered?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
1 (1974); Rahl, A Rejoinder, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 42 (1974). See also Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of
India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978); Todhunter Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 610
(E.D. Penn. 1974), findings amended383 F. Supp. 586.
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exemption, such risks and uncertainties could be expected to increase
the reluctance of businessmen to engage in the joint exporting activities
contemplated by the Webb-Pomerene Act. Also, removing such concerns with respect to exports of services, because they are not now covered, could be expected to stimulate such exports.
A second reason why the Justice Department's argument that the

Webb-Pomerene Act is unnecessary, since it expressly permits only activities that are unobjectionable in any case, is insufficient is that case

law indicates that the Webb-Pomerene exemption expressly permits
certain specific joint activities by Webb-Pomerene associations.23
These include a commitment by association members to use the export
association as their exclusive foreign outlet, the refusal of the associa-

tion to handle exports of U.S. competitors, determining quotas and
prices at which each member should supply products to the export as-

sociation, the fixing of resale prices at levels at which foreign distributors should sell the export association's products, and limiting foreign
distribution to handling products of the export association's mem-

bers.23 2 Without a statutory exemption, businessmen may hesitate to
engage in such export-related activities due to antitrust uncertainties.
The Justice Department has based its case for repeal of the Webb-

Pomerene Act on two principal arguments. First, it contends that the
Act provides a means by which firms, particularly in oligopolistic industries, engaging in joint exporting activities under the Act's protection may try to carry over such joint activity in their domestic
operations.23 3 This possibility of domestic anticompetitive spillover effects resulting from Webb-Pomerene association activities was also
cited by the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws
and Procedures in its recently issued report23 4 as an argument for re231 United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
232 Id. at 965. The court did note that special circumstances indicating unfairness or oppression might render unlawful even these activities. Id.
233 See Shenefield Interview, supra note 63, at AA-3, wherein he states:
It [the Act] leads, for instance, so easily to behavior with impacts inside this country, which is
always one of the reasons antitrust lawyers are very concerned about it. Companies get in the
habit of consulting one another on prices and production as to exports; it's a short distance
from that to a more general agreement.
The chief of the Antitrust Division's foreign commerce section has reportedly stated that, in certain cases, domestic restraints resulting from Webb-Pomerene association activities are "virtually
inevitable" and that the Justice Department is "itching to sue" a Webb-Pomerene association, but
has been unable to obtain the necessary evidence. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No.
892, at 16-17 (1978).
234 The NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT states that "the Act as drafted creates opportunities
for significant anticompetitive spillover effects in domestic comerce." I NATIONAL COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 196, at 302. The Report described the most likely spillover effects as those
related to the exchange, among domestic producers in oligopolistic markets, of export information
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peal of the exemption. However, this approach fails to take sufficiently
into account three key countervailing considerations. 23 5 First, hard evidence of domestic anti-competitive spillover effects resulting from
Webb-Pomerene association activities has yet to be demonstrated. The
fact that there have been only two suits brought by the Justice Department against Webb-Pomerene associations in the last twenty-five
years236 would seem to indicate that such effects have rarely been occurring. Second, even if such effects do occur, firms engaging in such
anticompetitive activities would not be protected by the Act and accordingly would be subject to suit.237 Third, the investigative and information gathering powers already provided by the Act 238 would seem
to be sufficient to uncover any domestic anti-competitive spillover effects resulting from Webb-Pomerene association activities. Finally,
even if Webb-Pomerene associations do provide a means for member
firms to carry over their joint activities into the domestic sphere, 'they
are not the only vehicle for implementing a conspiracy to restrain trade
in the United States. Firms interested in engaging in such conspiracies
hardly need the Webb-Pomerene umbrella to accomplish their objectives. It should be obvious that there are a whole host of other means
by which a conspiracy may be organized.
The Justice Department's second principal argument for repeal of
the Webb-Pomerene Act is that its existence is an embarrassment to the
United States when it argues in international forums against government sponsored or approved cartel activity and seeks international approval of a code of business conduct based largely on American
antitrust principles.2 39 While the Department of Justice's efforts to negotiate a code of business conduct based largely on American antitrust
principles should clearly be supported, international agreement on such
on future prices, costs, and production. Id. at 299. The Report states that because the exchange of
such information regarding foreign markets is permitted under the Webb-Pomerene Act, parallel
pricing in domestic markets is facilitated and large oligopolists are enabled to coexist both at
home and abroad. Id.
235 See generally 2 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 196, at 296.

236 United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, Inc., 393 U.S. 199 (1968), and
United States v. Anthracite Export Ass'n, Civ. No. 9171 (M.D. Pa.fledNov. 10, 1965). The latter
suit was settled by consent decree in 1970. See 1970 Trade Cases 1 73,348.
237 The Act specifically excludes activities having anti-competitive effects on U.S. domestic
commerce from the scope of the exemption. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 62, 63 (1976).
238 15 U.S.C. § 65 (1976).
239 Remarks of Joel Davidow, Director of Policy Planning, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Business Advisory Panel on Antitrust Export Issues (Dec. 1, 1978). Mr.
Davidow's remarks are discussed in the Report of that Panel in 2 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 196, at 296-97.
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a code, if it is ever concluded, may take many years.2 40 Until such an

agreement is concluded, the unilateral requirement that U.S. companies compete abroad on an unequal basis against foreign firms whose
countries allow joint exporting activities24 probably exacerbates this
country's already massive trade deficit.
Moreover, as the Business Advisory Panel on Antitrust Export Issues has noted, 4 2 the existence of the Webb-Pomerene Act is only one
of many obstacles to the successful conclusion of negotiations on a code
of business conduct. Furthermore, foreign governments realize that the
terms of treaties concluded by the United States with foreign nations
would control the activities of Webb-Pomerene associations. Accordingly, the unilateral repeal of the Webb-Pomerene Act is not likely to
improve significantly the United States' ability to negotiate pro-competitive concessions from foreign nations.
The second suggestion regarding the Webb-Pomerene Act would
attempt to minimize any perceived uncertainty in the business community as to the applicability of the statutory exemption by providing for
some type of "advisory opinion" or "certification" by the agency responsible for administration and enforcement of the statute as to the
legality of an association's planned activities at the time of registration
of the export association. Such an opinion or certification could be
based on a registration statement submitted by the association, describing in somewhat greater detail than is now required, the composition,
organizational structure, and proposed activities of the association. In
rendering its opinion, the appropriate agency would determine whether
the association's organization and operations would likely result in substantially lessening competition, restraining the domestic or import
trade of the United States, or substantially restraining exports by
domestic firms that are not members of the association. When rendered, the opinion would grant, at least for a specified period of time, a
complete exemption from both public and private actions under the
antitrust laws, so long as the association's organization and operations
conform to its registration statement as approved in the "advisory opin240 Assistant Attorney General John Shenefield has stated that he does not foresee the conclusion of major international agreements. Shenefield Interview, supra note 63, at AA-7.
241 The laws of this country's major trading partners provide an antitrust export exemption for
activities by nationals of their countries similar to that permitted for U.S. firms under WebbPomerene. See HearingsBefore the Subcomm on Antitrust andMonopoly ofthe Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary,89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1965) (Antitrust Development and Regulations of Foreign Countries); OECD, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (3d ed.
1971); OECD, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES OF THE OECD ch. 1 (1974).
242 See 2 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 196, at 296-97.
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ion" or "certification." Such a procedure is similar to that suggested
above243 for the Department of Justice's Business Review Procedure,
and would have some of the same advantages.
CONCLUSION

This article has discussed, in the context of the deteriorating international trade position of the United States, the problems the business
community has encountered regarding its perceptions as to the uncertain application of the antitrust laws to its international operations.
The response of the Justice Department to these claims has been stated.
The recommendations represent an attempt to deal with the business
community's concerns while leaving basic antitrust principles intact.
Such efforts must be made if the United States is to encourage its firms
to engage in international trade and investment while, at the same time,
protecting the economic benefits of vigorous competition fostered by
the antitrust laws.

243 See text accompanying notes 202-207 supra.

